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INTRODUCTION

If, as some have suggested, spending money is a protected exercise
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of religious' or political freedom, 2 what should be done when the

spender is insolvent?
Under established principles of commercial law, an insolvent person-one whose liabilities exceed one's assets-must receive fair economic value in exchange for transfers. A person cannot give gifts while
insolvent because gifts reduce the liquid assets the donor has to pay
creditors. Transfers made by an insolvent debtor for less than fair value,
such as religious or political donations, should be avoidable and recoverable by creditors or a bankruptcy trustee under fraudulent conveyance

laws. If, however, those transactions are determined to be a religious
exercise or a form of political speech, the First Amendment should
defeat application of these laws.

Although the definition of speech has expanded to encompass
much more than merely the right to criticize the sovereign, the definition
of free exercise has undergone a fairly summary contraction. In the case
of free exercise rights, the trend has been to apply a "feeble" form of

judicial scrutiny, leaving most laws of general application undisturbed
when in conflict with free exercise claims. For this reason, Congress
passed, and President Clinton signed into law, the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). RFRA provides that the government shall not "substantially burden" a person's exercise of religion,
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the
burden furthers a "compelling governmental interest" in the "least
restrictive" way possible.3 Although RFRA was struck down as it
applied to a state zoning law in City of Boerne v. Flores,4 it has been
used to defeat a fraudulent conveyance challenge to a religious gift aris-

ing under the federal Bankruptcy Code, which strongly suggests that
spending money could be a form of religious exercise.5 Because RFRA
may still apply to federal laws such as the Bankruptcy Code, and
because the political momentum that led to RFRA's passage continues,

strict scrutiny of applicable laws that impair religious exercise remains a
1. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407, reh'g en
banc denied, 89 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 is a defense to a fraudulent conveyance action), vacated and remanded, Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Church (In re Young) 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997) (vacating judgment and remanding in
light of holding in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (striking RFRA as it applied to
a state zoning law)).
2. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking certain campaign expenditure
limitations). See also J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE
L.J. 1001 (1985) (noting that Buckley effectively treats spending money as protected speech).
3. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, S. REP. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-I (a)-(c)), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.
4. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), rev'g City of Boerne, Texas v.
Flores, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
5. See In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1407.
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6
vital issue.

By contrast, speech enjoys a consistently expanding empire. Protected speech now includes the rights to publish, and profit from, falsehoods,7 parodies, 8 and liquor prices. 9 Some scholars argue that, to the
extent our economy becomes more dependent upon information technologies, the First Amendment may expand beyond its role as protector of
the right to express ideas, to shield the commercial transactions that
facilitate the expression of those ideas."
This article examines whether spending money is a form of religious exercise or speech through the lens of fraudulent conveyance laws.
If religious donations or political expenditures are protected by the First
Amendment, or statutes like RFRA, then fraudulent conveyance laws,
like other laws that impinge upon constitutionally protected rights,
would be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny and would survive only
if supported by an important governmental interest. Regardless of
whether the donor received any value in exchange for a gift, the economic concerns of the donor's creditors would be subordinate to the
First Amendment rights of the donor.
Section II of this article evaluates constructive fraudulent conveyance laws and the distinction between economic value, which, if sufficient in amount, should immunize a transaction, and non-economic
value (legal value), which may also constitute a defense to a fraudulent
conveyance action. Section II argues that the Supreme Court's recent
decision, BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation," is dangerous precisely
because of the implication it has for First Amendment rights. BFP
endorses the distinction between legal and economic value by holding
that the economic value received by a debtor is irrelevant to a fraudulent
conveyance challenge if a foreclosure on the debtor's property was procedurally proper. If, as BFP holds, the legal value inherent in the right
to foreclose is fair value, or proxy therefor, then the legal value of First
Amendment rights of a debtor-donor should also be a form of legal consideration. This conclusion, however, would do serious damage to the
underlying purpose of fraudulent conveyance laws, which is to protect
creditors. Section II concludes by noting that religious and political gifts
should not always be found lacking in consideration. Such transactions
6. Similarly, the Michigan and New York legislatures appear to be considering state versions
of RFRA. See Michigan H.R. No. 4376, introduced February 25, 1997 by Representative Profit;
ALBANY TIMES UNION, July 10, 1997, at B2 (regarding the New York statute).
7. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
9. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 255 (1992).
11. 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
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should be viewed in light of the underlying creditor protection purpose
of fraudulent conveyance laws. Where a debtor-donor actually receives
economic value, the transaction should be immune from avoidance even
if termed a gift.
Section III analyzes First Amendment protections for religious and
political expenditures. Section III.A argues that religious giving should
ordinarily be neither a protected form of worship under the First Amendment nor under RFRA, because free exercise should not encompass
spending money as a protected religious exercise. Section ILI.B
acknowledges Buckley's restraint on governmental power to cap political spending, but argues that, because fraudulent conveyance laws are
viewpoint and content neutral, they should be reviewed under less-thanheightened judicial scrutiny. Section III.B also analyzes the "Lochnerian paradox" that would result from using a Buckley defense in a
fraudulent conveyance action. Unlike other forms of regulation forbidden by the Lochnerian underpinnings of Buckley (as in Lochner v. New

York, 2 Buckley gives preference to the private right to spend money
over the government's public right to limit such spending), fraudulent
conveyance laws are essentially private, common law rights of action
that Lochner respects. In other words, Section III.B. shows that Buckbe internally inconsistent in the fraudulent conley's reasoning would
3
veyance context.'
Section IV discusses the judicial challenges in resolving this conflict and suggests a solution. First Amendment exceptions to fraudulent
conveyance laws should ordinarily meet judicial skepticism because, if
taken seriously, they would undermine the integrity of our commercial
system. If commercial laws such as fraudulent conveyance laws warrant
heightened judicial scrutiny, because religious donations or campaign
contributions are protected worship or speech, then the First Amendment, in effect, could absorb and trump nearly every commercial law.
This would be an absurd and dangerous result.
Among other problems, recognizing a First Amendment defense in
a fraudulent conveyance challenge would result in inconsistent application of the First Amendment. If the First Amendment rights of the
donor matter, then the First Amendment rights of the donor's creditors
should also matter. Because, in a sense, the creditor's money is used by
its debtor-donor, perhaps for causes the creditor finds repugnant, the
First Amendment cannot be consistently applied for the benefit of both
creditor and debtor-donor.
12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. This argument flows from the work of Professor Sunstein, among others. See, e.g.,
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 291-92.
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II.

FIRST PRINCIPLES AND FAIR CONSIDERATION
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE LAW-THEORIES OF CONSIDERATION

A.

Statutory Schemes

A transfer of property may be avoided as a fraudulent conveyance
under any of four statutory schemes, depending on which state's law
governs and whether the debtor-transferor is in bankruptcy. If the debtor
is not in bankruptcy, the following three statutes may be used: (i) the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA"), 14 adopted in 36 states; (ii)
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("UFCA"),15 adopted in five
states; and (iii) more current versions of the Statute of Elizabeth, the
English antecedent to all fraudulent conveyance laws. 6 If the debtor is
in bankruptcy, section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code may apply.1 7
Although there are several variations of constructive fraudulent conveyance laws, each has the same essential goal of redistributing to creditors
their pro rata share of the value of assets transferred for less than fair
value by their insolvent debtor."l
Fraudulent conveyance laws were initially developed to deter intentional acts that hindered, delayed, or defrauded creditors. Intent, however, was notoriously difficult to prove. 9 As a result, courts developed,
and modem statutes incorporated, certain presumptions based on badges
of frauds, acts, or states of affairs that, regardless of intent, rendered a
transaction presumptively fraudulent.2"
The most common badge of fraud is a transfer for less than "fair
consideration,' or "reasonably equivalent value, 22 by a debtor who is
14. As of June 1, 1997, the UFIA has been adopted by the following 36 states: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and

Wisconsin.
15. As of June 1, 1997, the following five states, plus the U.S. Virgin Islands, operate under
UFCA: Maryland, Michigan, New York, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
16. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-81 (Michie 1991); 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570) (Eng.).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1996).

18. See, e.g., Jack L. Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8
BANKR. DEv. J. 55, 80 (1991) ("The purpose of fraudulent transfer law is the preservation of the
debtor's estate for the benefit of its unsecured creditors.").
19. See, e.g., Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable
Risk, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1165, 1166 (1995).

20. Because intentionally fraudulent and criminal acts enjoy no First Amendment protection,
this article considers only constructively fraudulent conveyances, where a transfer can be avoided,
and money or assets recouped, regardless of the parties' intentions. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Scholes v. African Enter., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (N.D. Ill.
1994), affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Scholes v. Lehmann 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995).

21. Under the UFCA, this is known as a "fair equivalent" exchanged in "good faith." UNW.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3(a), 7A U.L.A. 448 (1985).
22. Both the UFTA and the Bankruptcy Code define consideration for this purpose as
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financially impaired. A debtor-transferor is financially impaired if, at
the time of the transfer or the incurrence of an obligation, or as a result
thereof, the debtor (i) was insolvent (i.e., had total debts that exceeded
the "present fair salable value ' 23 or "fair valuation"24 of its property);
(ii) was left with "unreasonably small" 25 capital or "assets" 26 ; or (iii)
intended, or believed (or, under the UFTA, "reasonably should have
believed" 27 ) it would incur debts beyond its ability to pay. In this context, the term "insolvent" describes this condition of material financial
impairment.28
In simplest terms, fraudulent conveyance laws protect creditors by
prohibiting a debtor who is insolvent from receiving less than fair value
for transfers. The classic example of a fraudulent conveyance arises

when a defendant makes a gift of all his or her assets to his or her spouse
just before an unfavorable judgment is rendered.29 While this example
suggests an intent to defraud creditors, the transaction is also constructively fraudulent because the debtor-defendant received inadequate economic consideration. The debtor-defendant's asset base is diminished,
thus impairing his or her ability to repay creditors in a timely way.
Constructive fraudulent conveyance laws protect creditors by forcing a debtor to maintain an adequate asset base, thus enhancing the likelihood of creditor repayment. The equitable maxim often invoked in
fraudulent conveyance litigations, "be just before you are generous, '"30
"reasonably equivalent value." UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 653
(1985 & Supp. 1991); 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1996).
23. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 2(a), 7A U.L.A. 442 (1985).
24. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 2(a), 7A U.L.A. 648 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
25. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 5, 7A U.L.A. 504 (1985); 11 U.S.C. § 548
(1)(2)(B)(ii)(1988).
26. UNtF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
27. Id. § 4(a)(2)(ii).
28. An issue that frequently arises in fraudulent conveyance litigation is whether a
challenging creditor or bankruptcy trustee has standing to avoid the transaction. As a general rule,
there must have been at least one unpaid creditor at the time of the allegedly fraudulent
conveyance for a court to find that a trustee has standing to sue. See Ohio Corrugating Co. v.
Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 70 B.R. 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1987); and Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 B.R. 430
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). The standing issue is beyond the scope of this article. For the purposes
of this article, the assumption is that a bankruptcy trustee challenging a religious or political
donation has standing.
29. See, e.g., Mannockes' Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B. 1571).
30. In the context of fraudulent conveyances, this equitable maxim is widely cited by courts.
E.g., Boston Trading Group v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1508 (1st Cir. 1987) (interpreting
Massachusetts law); Rudy v. Austin, 19 S.W. 111, 113 (Ark. 1892); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v.
Aldridge, 210 S.E.2d 791, 793 (Ga. 1974); Birney v. Solomon, 181 N.E. 318, 320 (I11.
1932); First
Nat'l Bank in Fairfield v. Frescoln Farms, Ltd., 430 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Iowa 1988); Lutherville
Supply & Equip. Co. v. Dimon, 192 A.2d 496, 498 (Md. 1963); Lafayette Fin. Corp. v.
Cunningham, 143 A.2d 700, 702 (R.I. 1958); Walker v. Loring, 36 S.W. 246, 247 (Tex. 1896);
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stems from the belief that creditors are the indirect victims of a debtor's
bad deals. Even if no intent to harm creditors exists, the fact that the
deal impairs the debtor's ability to repay debts is sufficient grounds to

avoid the transaction.
B.

Theories of Consideration

The central non-constitutional legal issue in a fraudulent conveyance litigation involving a First Amendment defense is how to measure
consideration the debtor-transferor receives. 3 ' If a debtor receives ade-

quate consideration for a transfer, then, even if insolvent (and whether or
not protected by the First Amendment), the transfer is not avoidable.32
Although it seems that a religious donation or a political contribution
should not, by definition, be supported by consideration, there are some
constructions of consideration and some factual circumstances where

consideration may be found for such transfers. This is true even under
the more modem statutes, where the trend is toward recognizing consideration as being valuable only if it is economic in nature.3 3

A useful analysis of consideration recognizes the distinction
between consideration having economic value and consideration having
legal value. Economic value consists of cash, assets, or their equivalent.
These preserve the debtor's asset base, liquidity, and ability to pay creditors in a timely manner. If sufficient, economic value received by a

debtor-transferor protects a transfer from a constructive fraudulent conveyance attack.
Legal consideration is more complex because it does not necessarBrimhall v. Grow, 480 F.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1971); Durham v. Blackard, 438 S.E.2d 259, 263
(S.C. Ct. App. 1993).
31. Insolvency, the other main question in a fraudulent conveyance action, is a question of
fact. Consideration and how it is measured appear to be mixed questions of law and fact.
Compare Butler Aviation, Int'l v. Whyte (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 6 F.3d 1119, 1125 (5th
Cir. 1993) (affirming that appellate courts review bankruptcy courts' findings of consideration de
novo), with In re Roco Corp., 701 F.2d 978, 981-82 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that appellate courts
review consideration determination only for clear error). See also Bundles v. Baker (In re
Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 825 (7th Cir. 1988) (giving "great deference" to a trial court's finding of
consideration).
32. This applies at least to the extent value was actually received by the debtor. See, e.g., 11

U.S.C. § 548(c);

UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER

Acr §§ 8(a), 9(2).

33. Compare Wilson v. Upreach Ministries (In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am.), 24 B.R.
973, 979 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that Bankruptcy Code section 548(a)(2)(A) "does not
appear to require that 'reasonably equivalent value' be a monetary equivalent") with Morris v.
Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239, 247 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (holding
that under Bankruptcy Code section 548, a transfer "must result in some economic benefit flowing
back to the debtor[s]"), affid, 203 B.R. 468, 473 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996). See also Wienman v.
Word of Life Christian Center (In re Bloch), 207 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) (citing In
re Newman) ("Contrary to the [d]efendant's assertions, the statute requires that the debtor must
have been provided with something of economic, as opposed to religious or spiritual, value").
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ily have economic value. Rather, it is a right conferred upon, or available to, the debtor. Although this can be adequate consideration for
fraudulent conveyance purposes, it is unclear why this is so, since the
purpose of the constructive fraudulent conveyance laws is to provide
economic protection to creditors. Creditors will not usually benefit from
the debtor's receipt of legal consideration in the same way they would if
the debtor received economic consideration because, ordinarily, a right
cannot be liquidated and distributed to creditors. Creditors cannot be
paid in the currency of the debtor's rights. Nonetheless, as will be
demonstrated, rights-or legal consideration-are often acceptable substitutes for economic consideration in defending a constructive fraudulent conveyance challenge. If the rights discussed below are adequate
consideration, there is no apparent reason why First Amendment rights
should not also be consideration for fraudulent conveyance purposes.
1. CONSIDERATION AS "ECONOMIC" VALUE
Although fraudulent conveyance laws offer a variety of tests for
measuring consideration, the majority rule requires that it have economic value to non-transferee creditors of the debtor in order to immunize a transfer. 34 "Only consideration of substantially equivalent
[monetary] value leaves the debtor in a financially similar position after
the conveyance. '35 The debtor's post-transfer financial position matters
because a conveyance made for less than reasonably equivalent economic value presumably leaves the debtor financially weak and less
likely to pay creditors. 36 This reflects the purpose of fraudulent conveyance laws-the protection of creditors by deterring or avoiding transactions that impair a debtor's ability to make repayment.
The majority view requires that courts measure consideration from
the perspective of creditors of the debtor, rather than from the perspective of the debtor. 37 "Consideration having no utility from a creditor's
viewpoint does not satisfy the statutory definition" of reasonably
34. Scholes, 854 F. Supp. at 1328 (finding religious gifts not supported by consideration).
See also First Nat'l Bank in Anoka v. Minnesota Util. Contracting (In re Minnesota Util.
Contracting, Inc.), 110 B.R. 414, 420 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United
States, 910 F.2d 240, 249 (5th Cir. 1990); Tcherepnin v. Franz, 475 F. Supp. 92, 97 (N.D. Ill.

1979).
35. Scholes, 854 F. Supp. at 1328. See also Zahra Spiritual Trust, 910 F.2d at 240, 249.
36. Scholes, 854 F. Supp. at 1328 (citing United States v. Kitsos, 770 F. Supp. 1230, 1235-36
n. 14 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("relevant determination is whetherfull value has been given")) (emphasis in

original).
37. See, e.g., Harmon v. First Am. Bank of Md. (In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Group, Inc.),
956 F.2d 479, 484 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The focus [under Bankruptcy Code section 548] is on the
consideration received by the debtor, not on the value given by the transferee.") (quoting Jack F.
Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8 BANr. . DEV. J. 55, 80
(1991)). See also Larrimer v. Geeney, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. 1963).
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equivalent value under UFTA. 38 From the creditor's standpoint, consideration must have a concrete, economic value to have any value at all.

Consideration cannot be merely love and affection. Rather, it must
materially enhance the debtor's asset base.39

Despite this general rule, it is obvious that many things have an
economic value to a debtor that will not have value to a creditor of the
debtor. For instance, personal services performed for a debtor-transferor, ° a creditor-transferee's forbearance from pursuing a collection
suit against the debtor, 4 the preservation of the debtor's goodwill,4 2

country club dues,4 3 the opportunity to gamble,' and the opportunity to
speak to a psychic on a 900 line45 have been accepted as consideration
having economic value, even though the value could run only to the
debtor. 6 Some courts have gone so far as to find economic value in
spiritual services performed for the benefit of the debtor.4 7 These deci-

sions, however, appear limited to situations where there is an economic
connection between the donation and the basis for the donor's gift, such
38. See UNn'. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3 cmt. 2, 7A U.L.A. 651 (1985).
39. See Zaretsky, supra note 19. Professor Zaretsky offers an interesting alternative approach
to fraudulent conveyance problems including, by implication, those addressed by this article.
Rather than focusing on the pleading requirements of the various constructive fraudulent
conveyance laws with their residual trappings of intent-based speculation, he argues that
fraudulent conveyance laws would more efficiently and effectively achieve their creditorprotection goal if viewed as arbiters of unreasonable risk. Transactions should be avoided,
according to Professor Zaretsky, if, in retrospect, the insolvent transferor took an unreasonable
risk with her assets.
40. See Boyd v. Sachs (In re Auto Specialties, Mfg.), 153 B.R. 457, 499 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1993), affd, 153 B.R. 503 (W.D. Mich. 1994); McColley v. Jacobs (In re North Am. Dealer
Group, Inc.), 62 B.R. 423,430 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986).
41. See Ward v. Building Material Dist. (In re Ward), 36 B.R. 794, 799 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984)
(reasoning that under Bankruptcy Code 'section 548(d)(2)(A), value includes securing an
antecedent debt).
42. See Cofax, Inc. v. D'Agostino (In re J.K. Chemicals, Inc.), 7 B.R. 897, 898 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1981); see also Pereira v. Checkmate Communications Co. (In re Checkmate Communications
Co.), 9 B.R. 585, 616-17 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 21 B.R. 402
(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
43. See Goldberger v. Bross (In re Complete Drywall Contracting, Inc.), 11 B.R. 697, 700
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
44. See Allard v. Flamingo Hilton (In re Chomakos), 170 B.R. 585, 593-94 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1993), aff'd, 69 F.3d 769, 771 (6th Cir. 1995).
45. See Samson v. U.S. West Communications, Inc. (In re Grigonis), 208 B.R. 950, 955-56
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1997).
46. See Robert J. Bein, Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Charitable Donations as Fraudulent
Transfers, 100 DICK. L. REv. 103 (1996) (arguing that not all charitable donations should be
found lacking in consideration).
47. See Wilson v. Upreach Ministries (In re Missionary Baptist Found.), 24 B.R. 973, 979
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (finding that goodwill constituted reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for charitable contribution); Ellenberg v. Chapel Hill Harvester Church, Inc. (In re
Moses), 59 B.R. 815, 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding that church services constituted
property for purposes of Bankruptcy Code section 548). See discussion infra Section II.B.3.a.
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as preserving goodwill where the debtor is also a religious
organization.48
Thus, although fraudulent conveyance laws generally require consideration to be economic and "fairly concrete," 49 it need not be
equivalent to that which was conveyed or valuable to the debtor's creditors. These exceptional cases are not necessarily wrong. Courts must
make the subtle determination whether the debtor-transferor received
value in light of the creditor-protection purpose of the fraudulent conveyance laws.
2. CONSIDERATION AS NON-ECONOMIC (LEGAL) VALUE
Although the purpose and text of fraudulent conveyance statutes
give great weight to the economic value a debtor-transferor receives,
"value" takes myriad forms. Many of these forms are neither concrete
nor especially valuable to the supposed beneficiaries of the law-the
debtor's creditors. Several cases, most importantly, the recent Supreme
Court BFP decision, go one step further and ignore the economics of a
transaction entirely. These cases conclude that the language of the
avoidance statute, the legal relationships of the transferor, or the procedural integrity of the transaction are proxy for economic value. In other
words, legal value, not economic value, may constitute adequate
consideration.
The simplest expression of legal value as adequate consideration in
the fraudulent conveyance context is found in certain interpretations of
the Statute of Elizabeth. Under these interpretations, transfers will be
validated if supported by "consideration deemed valuable in law," which
can be something less than reasonably equivalent value. 5" In these circumstances, the amount of consideration needed to immunize an allegedly fraudulent conveyance need only approximate the consideration
required to create a binding contract (i.e., a "peppercorn"). There is no
51
pretense of economic equivalence.
A more complex expression of legal value is the indirect benefit
defense. Under this theory, a debtor-transferor will be found to have
received adequate consideration not by virtue of any economic value it
received, but rather by virtue of the transferor's legal relationship to
48. See In re Missionary Baptist Found., 24 B.R. at 979. Cf Scholes, 56 F.3d at 759 (citing
Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1990)).
49. In re Young, 152 B.R. 939, 950 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
50. See, e.g. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-81 (Michie 1991).

51. See, e.g., C-T of Va. Inc. v. Euroshoe Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 762 F. Supp. 675 (W.D.
Va. 1991), aff'd, 953 F.2d 637, 639 (4th Cir. 1992) ("We agree that [Virginia Code Annotated §§]
55-81 [do] not require [the transfer of] reasonably equivalent value."); In re Springfield Furniture,
Inc., 145 B.R. 520, 533 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993); Hyman v. Porter, 37 B.R. 56, 65 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1984).
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another entity (e.g., an affiliate) that received the economic equivalent of
the bargain. 2 The indirect benefit defense typically arises in the context
of corporate groups, where one corporation agrees to guarantee the obligations of its corporate affiliate, without receiving direct consideration
itself. Although the economic benefit that the debtor-guarantor indirectly receives will be compared to the value of the property the debtor
transfers, such value could have no value to the debtor's creditors, since
creditors ordinarily benefit little, if at all, from the synergy of intercorporate relationships.53 Nevertheless, courts find value in the legal relationship between the debtor-guarantor and the beneficiary of the
guarantee.54

The most significant, and extreme, expression of the notion that
legal value can be adequate consideration is found in BFP v. Resolution
Trust Corp.55 In BFP, the Supreme Court held that the inadequacy of
the economic value received by a debtor in a foreclosure on property is
irrelevant if the foreclosure is conducted properly. According to the
Court, if the debtor's "rights" in the foreclosure are respected, then the
foreclosure cannot be avoided, regardless of the economic consequences
to the debtor or to creditors.
In BFP, the petitioners were partners in a partnership formed to
purchase a house in California subject to a first deed of trust in favor of
a bank that was subsequently taken into receivership by respondent, the
Resolution Trust Corporation.56 At the time of the purchase in 1987, the
petitioners gave a first mortgage for $356,250 to the bank, and a second
mortgage to the sellers to secure payment of the purchase price. In July
1989, with the petitioners in default on their loan payments, the house
sold for $433,000 at a foreclosure sale conducted by the bank. This
amount equalled the remaining indebtedness to the bank and to the
sellers.57
In October 1989, petitioners filed bankruptcy under chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code and filed suit under section 548 to avoid the foreclosure as a fraudulent transfer claiming that the house at the time of the
52. See, e.g., In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 6 F.3d 1119, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Jeffrey
Bigelow Design Group, Inc., 956 F.2d 479, 485 (4th Cir. 1992); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro
Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 646-47 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 937 (1992); In
re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 609 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983); Rubin v.

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991-92 (2d Cir. 1981); Telefast, Inc. v. VU-TV,
Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368, 1379-81 (D.N.J. 1984).
53. See Rubin, 661 F.2d at 993.
54. See supra note 52.
55. 511 U.S. 531, 542 (1994).
56. Id. at 533.
57. Id. at 534, 536.
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foreclosure was worth $725,000, not $433,000.8 The Bankruptcy Court
dismissed the complaint as to the sellers, and granted summary judgment for the bank. A divided Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment for the bank,59 reason-

ing that under the standard enunciated in In re Madrid,60 a non-collusive
and regularly conducted non-judicial foreclosure sale cannot be a fraudulent conveyance because the consideration received in such sale is-as
a matter of law-reasonably equivalent value.6" The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.62
Affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court held
that, under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, reasonably equivalent
value "is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all"
applicable state foreclosure procedures have been complied with,
regardless of the true economic value of the asset sold.63 As a result, the
Court established a foreclosure exception to the requirement that reasonably equivalent value be fair market value-or have any economic value
at all. 64
The Court held that, in the foreclosure context, procedural integrity,
not economics, determines value. According to the Court, this is so
because there is no market to refer to: "'fair market value' presumes
market conditions that, by definition, simply do not obtain in the context
of a forced sale. ...Market value cannot be the criterion of equivalence

in the foreclosure-sale context. '6 5 The Court reasoned that the legal
Id. at 534.
59. In re BFP, 132 B.R. 748 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991).
60. 21 B.R. 424 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982), affd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), and
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 83 (1984).
58.

61. In re BFP, 132 B.R. 748 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991).
62. In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992).
63. In re BFP, 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994).
64. Id. at 545. "[T]he 'reasonably equivalent value' criterion will continue to have
independent meaning (ordinarily a meaning similar to fair market value) outside the foreclosure
context." Id. Compare Justice Souter's dissent, which notes that the Court was thereby holding
that a "peppercorn" may constitute reasonably equivalent value. Id. at 555 (Souter, J. dissenting).

65. Id. at 538 (citations omitted). This is questionable, since one of the purposes of a
foreclosure notice (notice being the most important procedural requirement) is to attempt to attract
bidders to pay the foreclosing creditor and, if sufficient value is paid, to provide a return to the
mortgagor. See, e.g., Edry v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank (In re Edry), 201 B.R. 604,
607 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (avoiding foreclosure as fraudulent transfer where sale, although

conforming to the "bare notice requirement" of foreclosure statute, nevertheless was not
advertised according to the "general practice" of display advertising in newspapers and resulted in
sale price of 45% of fair market value of collateral). In turn, this creates the majority's missing

market. Of course, it is true that, at some level, it is unfair to subject a foreclosing bank to a
constructive fraudulent conveyance action, since it is merely exercising its remedies and not
attempting to take advantage of the debtor. Constructive fraudulent conveyance laws, however,
focus not on intent, but on the economic impact of a transfer on the debtor, permitting avoidance
where an insolvent debtor receives less than reasonably equivalent value in a transaction. The
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duress of foreclosure distorts whatever the market might otherwise be
because "property that must be sold within [foreclosure] strictures is
simply worth less."' 66 The Court did not elaborate on what the property
must be "worth less" than,67 but noted that it would be no more realistic
to ignore the legal characteristic of imminent foreclosure on the subject
property than to "ignore other price-affecting characteristics (such as the
fact that state zoning law permits the owner of the neighboring lot to
open a gas station). 68
The radical nature of this conclusion should not be missed. While
it may be true that the forced nature of a foreclosure sale affects value, if
Congress wanted to create a foreclosure exception, it would have done
so in the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, rights almost always affect value.
But that proves too much. The question, in the first instance, must be:
What does the statute say? Since it speaks of value, reference must be to
economics, not law.69

Consequently, the court's premise is out of touch with the law and
economics of foreclosure. First, there is a fairly well-developed and
profitable market for foreclosed properties.70 Second, it defeats the purposes of the foreclosure rules and fraudulent conveyance laws, both of
which are designed to protect not just a particular creditor (the foreclosing bank, for example), but the entire community of the debtor's creditors. The bank has no incentive to bid more than its debt (as in BFP) or
to create the conditions for vigorous and open bidding, which benefit
creditors as well as the debtor, by maximizing the price received at the
foreclosure. As a consequence, it will gain the opportunity to retake the
property and sell it for a profit (i.e., the difference between what the
Court's analysis in BFP precludes any judicial analysis of the consideration a debtor receives in a
foreclosure, although it offers no persuasive reason for its position.

66. Id. at 539 (emphasis in original).
67. The implication is that property not under the legal duress of imminent foreclosure may
be worth more, because the owner could bide time and sell at leisure. This seems to be a fact-

specific determination, unique to each case, and not a requirement of law in all cases of
foreclosure. For example, although subject to foreclosure today, the bottom could drop out of the
real property market tomorrow. The person who sells at leisure tomorrow may, therefore, get less
than the judgment debtor subject to foreclosure today. Moreover, many things can have an effect
on value; for example, the sudden need to move to a different city or a change in personal
circumstances. It is not clear why the Court viewed the legal duress of impending foreclosure by
the bank as somehow different in the valuation analysis. As Justice Souter's dissent notes, the

Court's treatment of value is ultimately problematic because it begs the question of how value is
determined. "If a property's 'value' is conclusively presumed to be whatever it is sold for, the

'less than reasonabl[e] equivalen[ce]' question will never be worth asking ..
J., dissenting).

" Id. at 555 (Souter,

68. Id. at 539.

69. See also id. at 555 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., France'sSuez Sells DistressedLoans to Goldman Sachs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28,
1997, at A12 (discussing "vulture funds" that purchase defaulted real estate debt).
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bank bid in and the fair market value it later receives). Fraudulent conveyance laws impose the most meaningful barrier to this kind of windfall to banks or other foreclosing secured creditors. Why the Court
ignored these concerns and established a foreclosure exception to the
fraudulent conveyance laws is, quite simply, unclear.
The Court probably did not anticipate the effect BFP could have in
the First Amendment context. Yet, the reasoning of BFP may prove
powerful in the hands of a religious or political debtor-donor, since it is
unclear why a First Amendment right should matter any less than a foreclosure right. In other words, if BFP is correct, why should a court not
ignore the legal and price affecting characteristics of transactions allegedly protected by the First Amendment?
The answer lies partly in the First Amendment itself, which, as will
be argued, 71 ordinarily should not act as a defense to a fraudulent conveyance action. The more basic question, discussed immediately below,
is whether transactions that appear to be gifts (i.e., religious or political
donations) actually lack consideration. As discussed in the following
subsection, courts should pay close attention to the consideration actually received by a debtor, even if the transaction is denominated a gift.
Although gifts create special fraudulent conveyance problems because
they are the classic form of fraudulent conveyance, the language and
policy of fraudulent conveyance laws suggest that not all religious or
political gifts lack real, economic value. In other words, not all such
gifts lack consideration sufficient to constitute a fraudulent conveyance.
3.

THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF GIFTS

Because religious contributions and political expenditures usually
appear to be gifts, it is important to understand exactly what renders a
transaction a gift as opposed to a bargained-for exchange. Gifts pose
special problems in constructive fraudulent conveyance law because, as
a matter of law, they are considered to lack consideration, while, as a
matter of fact, they may be supported by consideration of a concrete,
economic nature, thus having value from the perspective of a debtor's
creditors.
It would seem that a gift, by its very nature, could never be made

71. See discussion infra Section III.A.
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for consideration.72 Otherwise, it would not be a gift, but an exchange.73
And yet, as the Supreme Court stressed in Hernandez v. Commissioner,74 the structure of a transaction may well convert what purports to
be a gift, such as donations to a church for religious services, into a
bargained-for exchange.75 Moreover, as the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit noted in In re Young, 76 all aspects of a transaction must
be considered, so that merely labeling a transfer a gift or tithe, should
not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the transfer lacked consideration.77 By analogy, in the context of political expenditures, the result
should be the same, since certain political expenditures may well be reasonable economic risks, like gambling or investing. In either case,
courts should not summarily conclude that, because a transaction is
termed a gift, the transferor necessarily received inadequate economic
value in the exchange. 78 Instead, they should carefully examine if anything of economic value was received for the gift.
a.

Religious Gifts

Courts take a variety of approaches when valuing services or benefits provided by religious organizations from the more religious (attending Mass or High Holy Day services) to the more secular (counseling or
daycare services). The cases with the most expansive view of value,
Hernandez v. Commissioner79 and In re Young, 80 suggest that religious

donors may, under certain circumstances, receive economic consideration for their gifts, thereby converting what purports to be a gift into a
bargained-for exchange. Other courts take a much narrower view, purportedly allying themselves with the majority approach to questions of
consideration. In these instances, intangible value received by the donor
offers no protection for creditors of the debtor-transferor, and therefore,
is not adequate consideration for fraudulent conveyance purposes; only
72. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986) ("The sine qua

non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate
consideration."). See also Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173
(N.Y. 1927) (Cardozo, J.); King v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 647 N.E.2d 1196 (Mass. 1995); 1 E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.19 (1990).
73. See American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118; Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States,
910 F.2d 240, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1990).
74. 490 U.S. 680 (1988), aff'g 819 F.2d 1212 (1st Cir. 1987), and 822 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.
1987).
75. Id. at 690-91.
76. See In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1407.

77. See, e.g., In re Young, 152 B.R. 939, 945 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
78. See Bein, supra note 46.

79. 490 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1988).
80. See supra note 1.
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economic value will do."' Thus, while religious services ordinarily will
not be adequate consideration, courts should not hastily conclude that a
transaction involving a religious donation necessarily lacks consideration. It depends on what economic value the debtor, in fact, received.
An extreme example of religious services as consideration is Hernandez v. Commissioner, wherein the Supreme Court determined that

contributions to the Church of Scientology were not deductible under
section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code.82 The petitioners were members of the Church of Scientology, which charged its members a fixed
"donation" to gain access to auditing and training sessions.8 3 The
mandatory charges for these sessions varied according to the length and
sophistication of the session and could not be reduced except by prepayment. 4 These "mandatory fixed charges [were] based on a central tenet
of Scientology known as the 'doctrine of exchange,' according to which
any time a person receives something he must pay something back." 5
The proceeds of these fixed donations were the Church's primary source
of income.
As members of the Church, the petitioners sought to deduct auditing and training session payments to the Church as charitable contributions under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code.86 Although the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue stipulated that the Church was a religious organization entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions, 7 the
Commissioner challenged whether the payments made were, in fact,
"contributions or gifts" entitled to deduction under section 170 of the
Internal Revenue Code."
81. See, e.g., In re Bloch, 207 B.R. at 948 (noting that "the statute requires that the debtor
must have been provided with something of economic, as opposed to religious or spiritual,
value"); Fitzgerald v. Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church, Inc. (In re Hodge), 200 B.R. 884
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1996).
82. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1988). Section 170 of the Internal Revenue

Code provides that a taxpayer may deduct from taxable income any "contribution or gift to or for
the use of... [a] corporation, trust or community chest, fund, or foundation ... organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes .
U.S.C. § 170(c) (1997).

. . ."

26

83. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 685. According to the Court, auditing is the process in
Scientology by which a person becomes aware of their immortal spiritual dimension. Id. at 684.
84. Id. at 685-86, 692.
85. Id. at 685.
86. Id. at 686.
87. Id. In a separate case, however, decided while Hernandez was pending, the Tax Court
held that the Church of Scientology's mother church did not qualify as a tax exempt organization
for years 1970 through 1972 because, among other things, it had diverted profits to its founders
and others, and had conducted almost all of its activities for a commercial purpose. Id. at 686 n.4
(citing Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381 (1984), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1310
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988)).
88. Id.
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The lower courts held that, because the exchange between the petitioners and the Church was a quid pro quo, the petitioners received consideration in the form of a "measurable, specific return. '"89 The
"external features" of the transactions, these courts held, dictated that the
petitioners had received consideration. "It is the structure of the transaction, and not the type of benefit received, that controls." 90

Affirming the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioners' expectation of services in the form of auditing and training sessions stripped the payments of their contribution or
gift status. "Congress intended to differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients and payments made to such recipients in
returnfor goods or services."9 1 "[G]ifts," the Court explained, relying

on the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, are
"made with no expectation of a financial return commensurate with the
amount of the gift."9 2 "[T]hese payments were part of a quintessential
quid pro quo exchange: in return for their money, petitioners received
an identifiable benefit, namely, auditing and training sessions." 93
In dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the illogical inconsistency of
the IRS' method of valuing religious services.9 4 Justice O'Connor
explained that the IRS denied deductibility in Hernandez solely because
it viewed the exchange as a quid pro quo. As a result, she argued, the
IRS should also deprive a variety of more mainstream religious transactions of their exempt status, including payments for pew rents, the
purchase of High Holy Day admission tickets, or a tithe to obtain a temple recommend (the right to be admitted to the Mormon temple), since
all are quids pro quo.95 Moreover, she noted, treating religious transactions as quids pro quo made no economic sense where "the quid is
89. Id. at 688 (citations omitted). But for the price the church placed on the auditing and
training sessions, it is unclear how the value of these services could be measured. Certainly, to the
creditors of the petitioners, they would have had no value.
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 690 (emphasis added).
92. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 83-1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 196 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 831337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A44 (1954)).
93. Id. at 691. Why the Court agreed with the IRS that this benefit had economic value is
unclear. The majority opinion cited cases where deductions had been denied for parochial school
tuition. Id. at 693 (citing Foley v. Commissioner, 844 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1988) and Winters v.
Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972)). Yet, these cases seem facially distinguishable, since
an education may be purchased on the open market or obtained through the public school system.
The value of an education is more readily quantified, and therefore educational payments are not
as readily characterized as a contribution or gift. Purely religious services, by contrast, seem not
to have the same sort of market value, as Justice O'Connor noted in her Hernandez dissent.
Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 709-10.
94. Id. at 709-10.
95. Id.
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exclusively of spiritual or religious worth." 96 It would be impossible to

compute the value of "an intangible (or, for that matter a tangible) that is
not bought and sold except in donative contexts ..

.

Justice O'Connor was right about the valuation problem and the
fraudulent conveyance problem demonstrates why. If the majority was
correct-that religious services constitute consideration for tax purposes-then these services should also constitute consideration for
fraudulent conveyance purposes. Yet, if the creditor-protection policy
has any force, and consideration is measured from the perspective of the
donor's creditors, then it is difficult to see how economic consideration
existed or how it could be measured. It is unlikely that a debtor's
attending church could materially protect the interests of his or her
98
debtor's creditors.
Moreover, the Court's reliance on the structure rather than the substance of the transaction encourages anomalous results. Churches that
consider Hernandez carefully should impose external features on transactions that will ensure that donations are treated as quid pro quo
exchanges should the donors become insolvent. It seems contrary to the
mission of many religious institutions, however, to foist a quid pro quo
on an adherent at the time the adherent needs the institution's services.
Should churches be forced to make borrowers of beggars?
Arguably, because Hernandez is a tax case, its holding should be
limited to that arena. 99 However, since the tax code is designed to recognize and tax income-producing transactions, and to provide deductions for certain other transactions, a transactional approach that is
appropriate in the tax context should be equally appropriate in the fraudulent conveyance context. This is particularly so because both bodies of
law ordinarily give great weight to the economic substance of a transaction notwithstanding its form." °
96. Id. at 705.
97. Id. at 706. The Scientologists were undeterred by the decision. In 1993, following a
"campaign orchestrated by Scientology against the [IRS] and people who work there," the IRS
capitulated to the church's demand that it be given full tax exempt status. Scientology's Puzzling
Journey from Tax Rebel to Tax Exempt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1997, at 1, 30-31.

98. There are exceptional cases. See Wilson v. Upreach Ministries (In re Missionary Baptist
Found.), 24 B.R. 973, 979 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that goodwill constituted reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for a charitable religious contribution). In In re Missionary Baptist
Foundation, because both debtor-donor and the donee were religious institutions, it made good
business sense for the debtor to donate, or invest in, a counterpart religious institution. Id. at 979.
99. Both the Young district court and the Newman bankruptcy court effectively did this,
rejecting the application of Hernandez to the fraudulent conveyance challenges in those cases. In
re Young, 152 B.R. 938; In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 247. See also In re Bloch, 207 B.R. at 948

("Contrary to the [d]efendant's assertions, the statute requires that the debtor must have been
provided with something of economic, as opposed to religious or spiritual, value.").
100. See Ericsson Screw Mach. Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 757, 764 (1950) (holding
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Even if the form, or external features, should not control, a debtor
may nonetheless be found to have received consideration for a gift, if
"all aspects of the transaction" indicate that the debtor received either
direct or indirect economic consideration.' ° 1 Although not the holding
of In re Young, the most recent federal appellate decision on religious
donations as fraudulent conveyances, this dicta suggests that in the religious gift-giving context, an all-facts-and-circumstances modification to
the majority approach to consideration is appropriate. For different reasons, Young, as Hernandez, found that religious services, like other services, 9ould have economic value.
In Young, the spousal debtors, Bruce and Nancy Young, decided
that the failure of their business would not deter them from continuing to
give ten percent of their annual income to their church as they had done
for many years. 10 2 During the year preceding the filing of their bankruptcy petition, and while insolvent, they contributed a total of $13,450
1 3
to the Crystal Evangelical Free Church. 1
The Youngs' bankruptcy trustee sued under section 548(a)(2)(A) of
the Bankruptcy Code to recover these payments as constructive fraudulent conveyances. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties
stipulated that the only significant issue to resolve was whether the
Youngs received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for their
donations. 1o4
The bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion and denied the
Youngs' motion, holding that the debtors had received no economic
value for their tithe. 11 5 Any benefit the Youngs received was religious
in nature, and had benefited them personally. Their bankruptcy estate
(i.e., their asset base) had not benefited in any way (i.e., such benefits
could not be liquidated for the benefit of creditors).1" 6 The bankruptcy
court noted that, even if the Youngs had received any value, it was, by
definition, not in exchange for their tithe, since the church's worship
services and religious programs were available to all church members,
that tax consequences flow from "the result which the parties sought when they began their
transactions" regardless of the form taken); Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d
588, 592 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939). See also Randolph Paul & Philip
Zimet, Step Transactions, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 200 (2d Series 1938);
Sydney A. Gutkin, Step Transactions, 9 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1219 (1951).
101. See In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407.
102. Id. at 1410. See also Pierre Thomas, Clinton Stops Justice Department from Seeking
Forfeiture of Tithes, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1994, at A8; Laurie Goodstein, Religious Groups
Fight U.S. in Bankruptcy Case, WASH POST, May 23, 1994, at Al.
103. In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407.
104. Id.
105. In re Young, 148 B.R. 886, 890-91, 895-96 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992).
106. Id. at 893-94 & n.10.
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whether or not they were active donors.1"7
On appeal, the district court agreed and upheld the bankruptcy
10 8
court's finding that the debtors received inadequate consideration.
Good will and church services, the district court held, were not the sort
of fairly concrete benefits that constitute reasonably equivalent value for
fraudulent conveyance purposes. 1" The district court took a broader
approach to value, reasoning that "all benefits and burdens to the
debtor[s], direct or indirect," should be considered,11 ° not merely those
with "marketable financial value or economic utility from a creditor's
view," 1 as the bankruptcy court held. On this more expansive definition, the district court still concluded that the Youngs received inade12
quate consideration.
As discussed in Section III.A.2.c., infra, the Eighth Circuit subsequently viewed the question quasi-constitutionally rather than as an
issue of fraudulent conveyance law and found that RFRA prohibited
avoidance of the donations." 3 The Eighth Circuit, nonetheless,
approved the district court's more expansive view of consideration, stating that "[t]he district court correctly examined 'all aspects of the transaction and carefully measure[d] the value of all benefits and burdens to
the debtor, direct or indirect' including 'indirect economic benefits.""' 4
The Court of Appeals later emphasized this sentiment in an opinion
denying rehearing en banc, noting that there may be value in a variety of
religious benefits and services. "Our inability to assign a precise dollar
amount to these [religious] benefits ... does not mean that no value is
received."' 15 For support, the Eighth Circuit cited Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Hernandez, and noted that purchasing tickets for Jewish High
Holy Day services or paying for a Mormon temple recommend would be
instances where "religious contributions are directly linked to certain
benefits.""'16
The views expressed by the district court and the Eighth Circuit in
Young echo the holdings of In re Missionary Baptist Foundation of
107. Id. at 895-96.

108. In re Young, 152 B.R. 939, 948-49 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
109. Id. at 950. The Young district court noted that the Moses case (discussed infra note 118
and accompanying text) was distinguishable on the grounds that the debtor in that case was
required to make donations in order to maintain a position as deacon. Id.
110. Id. at 945.
111. In re Young, 148 B.R. at 894.
112. In re Young, 152 B.R. at 948-49.
113. In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1415 (noting that "whether the debtors received any economic
benefit ...

is beside the point").

114. Id. at 1415 (quoting In re Young, 152 B.R. 939, 945 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993)).
115. In re Young, 89 F.3d at 495.
116. Id. (citing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 691 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
The question of whether these benefits have economic value is left unanswered.
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America, Inc.,' 17 and In re Moses."' These cases held that the economic value to the religious donor of religious and secular services were
adequate consideration for religious donations. Moreover, a donor can
receive economic benefit from religious and secular services, and the
proper focus is economic, not religious.
In Missionary Baptist, for example, the court found that religious
services preserved goodwill, and thus, yielded adequate consideration.'1 19
Presumably this finding relied on the fact that the debtor, like the
church, was a religious organization.
Equally illustrative is the finding of the Moses court, that, in addition to such benefits as daycare and counseling,
access to religious services which Debtors attended at least three
times a week also possessed exchangeable value. Although pure economic exchange which takes place between religious institutions and
those who use their facilities is understandably downplayed so as to
preserve the pious nature of such places of worship, such an
exchange nevertheless exists. Many religious institutions require
their congregation to pay dues to cover expenses of operation. Heating, air conditioning and electrical services, as well as other costs of
operation are not provided to churches cost-free. . . . While this
Court does not intend to value the amount of spiritual enrichment
Debtors gained by engaging in worship, this Court does find that certain facilities and services provided by [the church], i.e., access to the
church which provided heating, air conditioning and electricity, do
possess an exchangeable value. 120
These courts were not necessarily wrong. Consideration requires a
case-by-case analysis. Similarly, the many courts that reached opposite
conclusions are not necessarily wrong. For instance, Zahra Spiritual
Trust,'21 Hodge,12 2 Newman,'2 3 and Bloch124 are all decisions which
held that a wide range of services provided to a debtor-donor, including
"spiritual fulfillment,"'' 25 counseling, 26 occasional transportation, and
117. 24 B.R. 973, 979 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 1982) (finding that goodwill constituted reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for a charitable contribution).
118. In re Moses, 59 B.R. 815, 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (noting that church services

constituted property for purposes of Bankruptcy Code section 548).
119. In re Missionary Baptist Found., 24 B.R. at 979.
120. In re Moses, 59 B.R. at 818-19.
121. Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1990).

122. Fitzgerald v. Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church, Inc. (In re Hodge), 200 B.R. 884
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1996).
123. Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kans.
1995), aff'd, 203 B.R. 468 (D. Kan. 1996).
124. Wienman v. Word of Life Christian Center (In re Bloch), 207 B.R. 944 (D. Colo. 1997).
125. Id. at 948.
126. In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 247-48.
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minor home and auto repair services, 2 7 lacked the value necessary to

immunize the religious donations from avoidance.
Courts face two kinds of problems when attempting to place an
economic value on services or benefits provided by a religious organizations. First, courts should not ignore the economic value of services or
benefits received by a debtor-donor simply because the provider of the
service or benefit happens to be a religious institution. For instance, the
Hodge and Newman courts held that church-provided services, such as
counseling and auto repairs, lacked monetary value, and were therefore,
inadequate consideration for fraudulent conveyance purposes. 2 8 This
appears facially incorrect. If the debtor did not obtain these services

from the church, the debtor would presumably have obtained them from
a non-church entity, and may have paid more than the amount donated.
Under such circumstances, the debtor's asset base would have been
more significantly diminished than it was by the transaction with the
church.' 29 In light of the overriding creditor-protection purpose of the
fraudulent conveyance laws, Hodge's and Newman's conclusions, that

benefits lack value if provided by a church, appear incorrect.
The second problem courts face is the spiritual valuation issue identified by Justice O'Connor in Hernandez. 30 Essentially, the problem is
how to value that to which a dollar value cannot be assigned. 31 Courts
127. Id.
128. The Hodge and Newman courts justify their holdings by focusing not on the value
actually received, but on whether the value was received in exchange for the donation. See, e.g.,
Fitzgerald v. Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church (In re Hodge), 200 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1996) (holding that because church-donee's services were made available to all church
members, no consideration was received by debtor-donor). See also In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396,
399 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995) (noting that church accepted debtors with or without tithing); In re
Newman, 183 B.R. at 248 (finding no economic nexus between the services provided and the level
of tithing by donor-debtor); In re Lees, 192 B.R. 756, 758 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994) (finding no loss
of privileges if tithing is reduced or eliminated); In re Packham, 126 B.R. 603, 608 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1991). See also In re Bloch, 207 B.R. at 948 ("Contrary to the [d]efendant's assertions, the
statute requires that the debtor must have been provided with something of economic, as opposed
to religious or spiritual, value.").
One could argue that the phrase "in exchange for" need not require a direct link between
transaction components (i.e., a quid pro quo exchange). Indeed, the indirect benefit defense,
discussed in Section II.B.2., supra, would appear to be either a very broad interpretation of "in
exchange for," or an exception to it. Moreover, because the primary goal of fraudulent
conveyance law is to preserve the value of a debtor's estate for the benefit of creditors, the
construction of the phrase "in exchange for" should be a secondary concern. Indeed, the phrase
does not appear in the UFCA or the Statutes of Elizabeth.
129. See In re Moses, 59 B.R. at 818 (noting the higher cost of obtaining counseling and
daycare services from a nonreligious provider).
130. See supra notes 79-100 and accompanying text.
131. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 705-06 (stating that where "the quid [in a quid pro quo] is
exclusively of spiritual or religious worth," it would be impossible to compute the value of "an
intangible (or, for that matter a tangible) that is not bought and sold except in donative contexts
) (O'Connor,
.....
J., dissenting).
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that attempt to do so should tread lightly since it is unclear how courts
could ever assign a dollar value to spiritual services. Such services not
only lack economic value due to their pious nature, 32 but they also have
a value that is inherently subjective. Courts could not assign a dollar
value to these services without inquiring into the sincerity and depth of
the religious values held by the donor. Inevitably, an entanglement
problem would result. 33 It is equally unclear how courts could perform
such a valuation in a neutral manner across religious lines as required by
the Free Exercise Clause or, to the extent still applicable, the RFRA. In
short, although there may be cases where it is possible to value the spiritual, it seems that the highly problematic task is best avoided by the
courts. Rather, as the Young and Moses courts did, courts should look
carefully at the measurable economic value the debtor received and
determine whether that value was reasonably equivalent to the debtordonor's gift.
In short, it is not readily apparent that religiously-motivated gifts
always lack consideration for fraudulent conveyance purposes. The
hardest cases, such as pew rents and High Holy Day tickets, must be
viewed for fraudulent conveyance purposes through the same lens as all
other transactions. If a court finds that there is a market for these services, it should be able to find that the debtor-donor received economic
value for the gift, without having to inquire into the sincerity of the
donor's beliefs. The mere fact that the transaction is termed a gift, or
results in the purchase of a religious item, such as a seat in a church or a
non-religious item from a church such as counseling, however, should
not lead to the conclusion that the debtor-transferor received inadequate
consideration.
b. Political Gifts
In contrast to the broad range of approaches courts have used to
determine whether consideration exists in the religious giving context,
there is considerably less case law in the political-giving context.
Although one case, 1992 Republican Senate-House Dinner Committee v.
Carolina'sPride Seafood, Inc.,"' considered the issue, the court summarily dismissed the prospect that the donor could have received economic or legal value in exchange for a political contribution. Yet, it is
unclear whether, in every instance, a political contribution or expenditure should be determined to be lacking consideration. If, as some
courts have held, gambling or investing while insolvent are not per se
132. See In re Moses, 59 B.R. at 818.
133. See discussion infra Section IlI.A.I.
134. 858 F. Supp. 243 (D.D.C. 1994).
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fraudulent conveyances, 35 why would contributing to the re-election of
a candidate whose policies may yield an improved business climate not
also be considered as such? Would the result be different if the insolvent donor were also the candidate?
In Carolina'sPride, the debtor and his corporation, International
Marketing Bureau, Inc. ("IMB"), donated $500,000 to the 1992 Republican Senate-House Dinner Committee (the "Committee"), an unincorporated association registered with the Federal Election Commission.1 36 In
of March 1992, Kojima caused IMB to contribute $400,000 to the Committee, an exchange which entitled Kojima to sit at a Committee dinner
with the then-Vice President of the United States. 37 Hoping to dine
with the President, Kojima contributed another $100,000 of his own
138
funds, for which he gained a seat with the President.
Although a strong supporter of the Republican party, Kojima apparently showed less support for his creditors. The media, covering the
dinner characterized Kojima as a deadbeat dad, who allegedly owed
more than $100,000 in unpaid child support. 139 In May of 1992, following creditor suits to avoid Kojima's donations, the Committee filed an
interpleader action against Kojima's creditors, asserting its entitlement
to retain the $500,000 contributed by Kojima and IMB. 14 0
Applying California's UFTA, the District Court for the District of
Columbia considered only the tangible economic value Kojima received,
not the intangible value of the opportunity he purchased. 4 ' The court
found that Kojima received less than reasonably equivalent value
because, when measured monetarily, he received only minimal consideration for his contributions (probably, a mere chicken dinner). 4 2 Dismissing the Committee's claim in derisive terms, the court held that the
intangible value Kojima received for his contribution excluded "'the
value that comes from supporting sound government policies,' invitations to various events, and the opportunity to sit at the head table.' 4 3
135. See Allard v. Flamingo Hilton (In re Chomakos), 170 B.R. 585, 595 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1993), aff'd, 69 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that insolvent debtor received reasonably
equivalent value for opportunity to gamble). Cf.In re Morris Communications NC, Inc., 914 F.2d
458, 460, 475 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding investment in non-wireline cellular phone license lottery
unreasonably risky, and therefore, not reasonably equivalent value). See also Bein, supra note 46.
136. Carolina's Pride, 858 F. Supp. at 245.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 245-46.
140. Id. at 246 n.6.
141. Id. at 248. The court declined to answer the question as to IMB, since it believed more
discovery was necessary to determine whether defendants were entitled to bring a claim against

IMB under a theory of "reverse veil-piercing." Id. at 250-51.
142. Id. at 249.
143. Id.
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Citing the district court holding in Young, the Carolina's Pride court
reasoned that, from a creditor's perspective, "donations may cause the
rapid dissipation of assets which could render the debtor insolvent."'"
Consequently, the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find
that Kojima received reasonably equivalent value for his
contributions. 145
Should the court have so readily dismissed the opportunity value
Kojima purchased? If, as other courts have held, gambling, investing, or
calls to a telephone psychic 14 6 are opportunities that have value to a
debtor, it is hasty to assume that "investing" in a political campaign is
any less prudent. For instance, in In re Chomakos, the Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan concluded that insolvent debtors that gambled received reasonably equivalent value for their expenditures because they purchased the opportunity to win more than they
invested.147 The risk was not unreasonable because the debtors were
regular gamblers who frequently won. Although gambling may not
have been the debtors' business, it was not an activity "so abnormal,
unforeseeable or outrageous as to require" a finding that the gambling
148
payments should be avoided.
As Professor Zaretsky noted, perhaps the real issue in fraudulent
conveyance litigation is the reasonableness of the risk undertaken by the
insolvent debtor. "Fraudulent transfer law does not bar debtors from
taking risks with their creditors' funds. It does, however, regulate the
permissible degree of risk."' 49 Under this theory, a campaign expenditure may be a sound investment, particularly if it aids one's own
campaign.
Consider a scenario where President Clinton lost his bid for reelection, and thereafter, financially exhausted from his legal crises, filed
personal bankruptcy. Would a bankruptcy trustee appointed for President Clinton be able to avoid expenditures made in aid of his own candidacy? What about his expenditures in aid of important Congressional
allies? All such expenditures may be considered reasonable investments, since from a purely commercial perspective, they would be similar to the kinds of capital risks undertaken every day. It is not clear why
a lower risk threshold should apply to candidates for elected office.
Because it is unclear whether consideration must always be money
144.
145.
146.
(Bankr.
147.
148.
149.

Carolina's Pride, 858 F. Supp. at 249.
Id.
See Samson v. U.S. West Communications, Inc. (In re Grigonis), 208 B.R. 950, 955-56
D. Mont. 1997).
In re Chomakos, 170 B.R. at 593.
Id. at 595.
See, e.g., Zaretsky, supra note 19, at 1173 (1995).
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or its equivalent, a broad approach to consideration is appropriate in the
context of religious or political giving, consistent with the creditor-protection purpose of fraudulent conveyance laws. At the very least, courts
should not assume that simply because a transaction is characterized as a
donation, the donor ipso facto received inadequate consideration.
More importantly, there is the possibility that those types of trans-

actions are protected by the First Amendment, or by statute, either of
which may constitute an independent defense. Alternatively, by application of the principle enunciated in BFP, the availability of such rights
may be legal consideration. Because, as discussed below, this reasoning
could wreak havoc on commercial laws, and because spending money
should not be deemed to be worship or speech, fraudulent conveyance

laws should not be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny under the First
Amendment.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND LEVELS OF SCRUTINY

The Supreme Court assesses the constitutionality of statutes by
determining the level of scrutiny it should apply to the challenged statute. The Court then weighs the state's need for the statute against the

individual's right to an exemption from it in light of the chosen level of
scrutiny. 5 ° The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")
attempted to impose strict scrutiny on courts reviewing laws that substantially burdened religious exercise, and further attempted to remove
the authority from the judiciary to determine which standard applied.
Theoretically, the essential inquiry is the same for all purposes: If a
150. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 943-44 (1987). The levels-of-scrutiny approach was first suggested in United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), where the Court recognized that certain rights
would receive increased judicial protection in the form of a "more searching judicial inquiry." See
also Daniel J. Solove, The Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion
in Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459, 460, n.9 (1996) (citing 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 20.7, at 19 (2d ed. 1992)). Although the Court and

commentators have attempted to categorize the levels of scrutiny applied, the Court's precedent is
not consistent. It is generally assumed that the Court reviews statutes under one of the following
three levels of scrutiny: strict, intermediate, or rational basis review. However, Justice Stevens'
point in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. seems correct: "[O]ur cases have
not delineated three-or even one or two-such well-defined standards. Rather, our cases reflect
a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications which have been explained in
opinions by terms ranging from 'strict scrutiny' at one extreme to 'rational basis' at the other."
473 U.S. 432, 451 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).
This article does not seek to break new ground in divining the Court's tiered-scrutiny
analysis, especially given the confusion surrounding free exercise jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Michael C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1175, 1213
n.167 (1996) ("pre-Smith case law is hardly coherent or definitive"). Rather, it seems that the
more important the right at issue, the more severe the Court's scrutiny of the statute that allegedly
interferes with that right.
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statute, such as the fraudulent conveyance statute, is subject to height-

ened scrutiny, the government must show that the statute satisfies a compelling governmental interest. The viability of fraudulent conveyance
laws, as applied to religious or political gift-giving, therefore, depends
on the level of scrutiny applied and the relative importance of the fraud-

ulent conveyance statutes.
'

Strict, or heightened, scrutiny is "the most rigid"' 51 and "exact-

ing
judicial examination a statute can undergo. Among others, the
Court has applied strict scrutiny analysis to cases involving contentbased restrictions on speech,1 53 and laws that are said to impair fundamental rights.154 Under the strict scrutiny analysis, the government must
show that the interests protected by the statute are "compelling," ' 5 5 "paramount," '5 6 "overriding," ' 57 or "of the highest order."1 58 Moreover, the

government must show that the law is the least intrusive means of furthering those compelling interests. 59 This discussion focuses on cases
such as Sherbert,16 0 Yoder,16 1 and Buckley,16 which have subjected
facially neutral statutes to strict scrutiny because of their affect on worship or political spending.
Few laws are subject to strict scrutiny. The vast majority of laws
are subject to either intermediate or minimal levels of scrutiny. Interme-

diate scrutiny is reserved for governmental interests that a court consid-

151. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214. 216 (1944) (holding that the internment of
Japanese citizens did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
152. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (holding that admissions
policy with racial quotas violates the Equal Protection Clause).
153. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (holding that a ban on
"electioneering" within 100 feet of polling sites satisfies strict scrutiny).
154. See U.S. v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2286-87 (1996) (finding that establishing an allfemale military academy to preserve adversative all-male military academy is not supported by
"exceedingly persuasive justification").
155. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding that a total ban
on indecent dial-a-porn services was invalid under strict scrutiny).
156. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (holding that statute requiring labor union
organizers to register with state before soliciting membership, as applied to unregistered union
organizer who gave public speech, violated the First Amendment).
157. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (holding that the denial of
tax-exempt status to a religious university that refused to admit interracially married applicants
satisfied strict scrutiny).
158. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause
mandated that the Amish be exempt from mandatory schooling laws).
159. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126.
160. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
161. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1992).
162. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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ers "important"' 6 3 or "substantial,"1 6 4 but not necessarily of the highest

order. Courts apply intermediate scrutiny in cases involving genderbased classifications, 65 content-neutral restrictions on speech in public
fora, including those governing time, place, and manner,166 and restric1 67
tions on commercial speech.
Minimal scrutiny, often referred to as rational-basis review, 168 is

the least stringent form of constitutional scrutiny. When applying minimal scrutiny, courts uphold the law if it bears a rational relation 169 to a
legitimate governmental purpose.170 The Court has provided various
interpretations of minimum scrutiny, ranging from rational-review-withbite, as in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,

71

to cases

that sustain a law even if it is "based on rational speculation unsupported
by evidence or empirical data." 1 72 Minimal scrutiny is used when
reviewing restrictions of access to nonpublic fora, 173 nonsuspect classifi163. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (holding that workers'
compensation statute that treated widows differently from widowers violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
164. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (upholding conviction of a defendant
who burned his draft registration certificate in order to express antiwar beliefs).
165. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (affirming
that nursing school's women-only admissions policy was unconstitutional). But see United States
v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2286-87 (1996) (finding that establishing an all-female military
academy to preserve adversative all-male military academy is not supported by "exceedingly
persuasive justification").
166. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (upholding Cable
Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992 under intermediate scrutiny as content-neutral
economic legislation); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (upholding city's
requirement that performers in public parks must use city-provided sound equipment and
technicians).
167. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 546-66
(1980) (holding that ban on promotional advertising by electric utilities was more extensive than
necessary to further state's interest in energy conservation and fair rate structure). But see 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (1996) (holding that the First Amendment
protects right to advertise liquor prices).
168. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (holding that involuntary commitment of
mentally retarded individuals did not violate equal protection or due process rights).
169. See id. at 320.
170. See id.
171. 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1984) (holding that requiring special use permit for proposed group
home for retarded persons failed to pass muster because "the record does not reveal any rational
basis for believing the [group] home would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate
interests").
172. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (holding that statute's
distinction between separately and commonly owned buildings for purposes of franchise
requirement had a rational basis).
173. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 67879 (1992) (upholding ban on face-to-face solicitation in airports, but striking ban on distribution of
literature).
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cations, 174 and infringements on nonfundamental rights. 17 5

Whether fraudulent conveyance laws violate the First Amendment
also requires a determination of whether a fraudulent conveyance lawsuit constitutes state action, because the First Amendment only precludes state interference with religious or political freedoms.1 76 If a
fraudulent conveyance lawsuit is merely a private action, then First

Amendment rights are not implicated. This is not a simple issue, since
the rights asserted in a fraudulent conveyance action are usually private

rights, such as claims arising from contracts or torts. If, however, New
York Times v. Sullivan 177 and Fuentes v. Shevin 17 ' are correct, and libel
or foreclosures, respectively, are state actions, then arguably, a constructive fraudulent conveyance action, frequently termed a quasi-contract
action, is also state action.1 79 In this article, I treat a fraudulent conveyance action as state action involving the enforcement of private rights.
A.

Free Exercise & RFRA

The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .... ,"Io Although the Court recently interpreted
the Free Exercise Clause to mean that "[a]bsent the most unusual circumstances, one's religion ought not affect one's legal rights or duties or
benefits,"181 Congress attempted, through RFRA, to reverse the presumption implicit in the Court's interpretation. In RFRA, Congress
sought to subject neutral laws of general application to heightened scrutiny if they substantially burdened religious practice. Further, Congress
directed courts to strike such laws unless supported by a compelling
174. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1991) (upholding requirement that
state judges retire at age of 70).
175. See, e.g., id. at 471.
176. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972).
177. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). See also Sunstein, supra note 10, at 269 (discussing state
action doctrine).
178. 407 U.S. 67, 70-71 (1972).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Neidorf, 522 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1975). It appears the issue
has not been addressed in any published fraudulent conveyance/First Amendment decision. One
may argue that, unless a state actor is involved in the fraudulent conveyance action-a sheriff to
execute, a trustee in bankruptcy to prosecute an action-then a simple fraudulent conveyance
action prosecuted by a contract creditor involves no state action. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-6, at 17-11-1713 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Flagg Brothers
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (finding no state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
where assets sold at privately conducted foreclosure, even though state marshals seized assets for
transfer to auctioneer)).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This provision applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
181. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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state interest and a showing that the law is the least restrictive means of
furthering such interest. 8 2 Although RFRA has since been struck down
as it applies to state law, 183 Young held that RFRA defeats a fraudulent

18 4
conveyance challenge under the Bankruptcy Code to a religious gift.
Since RFRA may continue to apply to federal laws such as the Bank-

ruptcy Code, and a number of states may adopt similar versions of
RFRA, it is entirely possible that statutory strict scrutiny could continue
to be applied to fraudulent conveyance laws when used to recover religious donations. 85
Heightened scrutiny should not ordinarily be applied to a fraudulent
conveyance attack on a religious donation, because fraudulent conveyance laws are facially neutral, commercial laws of general application.
Unless aimed at a particular religious group or practice, or applied in an
uneven or discriminatory manner, fraudulent conveyance laws should be
reviewed under less-than-heightened scrutiny, like other economic regulations that compete with the Free Exercise Clause.
1.

FREE EXERCISE AND STRICT SCRUTINY-"FEEBLE IN FACT"

In order to understand what RFRA sought to restore, it is necessary

to understand the Court's free exercise jurisprudence prior to Smith, 186
the case Congress sought to overrule through enactment of RFRA.
Unlike the application of strict scrutiny in other fields, characterized as a
"barrier [that is] strict in theory and fatal in fact,"' 8 7 in pre-Smith religious exemption cases, the test has been characterized as "strict in theory but feeble in fact."' 188 Outside of the employment context, the Court
182. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, S. Rep. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-I (a)-(c) (1997)), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.
183. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 762 (1997), rev'g City of Boerne, Texas v. Flores,
73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996). As discussed in Section III.A.2., it appears to matter little for
purposes of this article that the Court struck RFRA as applied to state law since, among other
reasons, the Bankruptcy Code is federal law.
184. See In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407.
185. As to the continued viability of RFRA against federal laws, see Linda Greenhouse, Laws
Are Urged to Protect Religion, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1997, at A8 (indicating that scholars view
RFRA as having survived Boerne as against federal laws). In addition, some states are
contemplating state versions of RFRA. For example, Michigan appears destined to be among the
first, with House Bill No. 4376, introduced February 25, 1997 by Representative Profit. It passed
the Michigan House but had not, as of July 1997, been considered by Michigan's Senate. The
New York State Assembly may introduce a similar bill. See ALBANY TIMES UNION, July 10,
1997, at B2.
186. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
187. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
188. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 446-47 (quoting Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasis for Protecting
Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1247 (1994) and Gunther, supra note 187, at 8.
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has never used that standard to shelter religious conduct from a facially
neutral law of general application, at least where no other protected constitutional interest was at issue.
a.

Pre-Smith Free Exercise

Prior to Smith, free exercise jurisprudence was governed by Sherbert v. Verner, 8 9 which held that the belief-versus-practice distinction,
used for approximately 100 years, no longer applied. 190 Rather, the state
was required to show a compelling interest in denying unemployment
benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist church member ineligible for work
due to religious observance requirements.' 91 The First Amendment
claimant argued that denying her unemployment benefits violated her
free exercise rights. The Court agreed.
The Court reasoned that denying benefits impermissibly burdened
the claimant's free exercise rights by causing her to forego a benefit if
she chose to follow the dictates of her religion. 92 The fact that the
unemployment benefits involved were a privilege instead of a right was
insufficient to overcome the constitutional problems arising from denial
of these benefits, particularly when the ultimate reason was the claimant's religious beliefs.1 93 To the contrary, "[g]overnmental imposition
of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of
religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
worship."' 94
The effect of Sherbert was to treat religious practice as a substantive right beyond regulation in matters that are very important to the
individual.' 95 Almost a decade later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the
Supreme Court upheld this point of view. 196 In Yoder, Amish parents
challenged a law that required their children to attend school up to the
age of sixteen.1 97 The Court found that the Wisconsin law violated the
Amish parents' free exercise rights in that it "affirmatively compel[led]
them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at
189. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
190. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
191. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09.

192. Id. at 404.
193. Id. at 404, 406.
194. Id. at 404. This analogy seems strained in light of the fact that unemployment benefits
were in question. A fine implies that the state took something from Sherbert for exercising her
right to worship. But the state provided benefits to which she was entitled notwithstanding the
observance requirements of her religion.
195. See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62
FOROHAM

L.

REV.

883, 885 (1994).

196. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
197. Id. at 207.
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odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs." '9 8 This right,
coupled with the parental right to control the religious upbringing and
education of minor children,' 99 created a personal liberty greater than
the state's interest in providing compulsory education for children. 2°°
b. Smith
Smith was the death of heightened scrutiny in contests between the
Free Exercise Clause and neutral laws of general applicability. 201 The
claimants in Smith were fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation center because they ingested the hallucinogenic drug peyote while
attending a religious ceremony of the Native American Church in violation of Oregon law.2°2 When they applied for unemployment compensation benefits, the state denied their request, on the grounds that they had
lost their jobs because of work-related misconduct. 20 3 The claimants
sued, alleging that the Oregon law denying their claim violated their free
exercise rights.
Although the Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the claimants, 2°
the U.S. Supreme Court did not. Instead, it held that the right to free
exercise did not relieve an individual of the duty to comply with an
otherwise valid law of general application.20 5
To make an individual's obligation to obey such a [facially neutral]
law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs,
except where the State's interest is "compelling"-permitting him,
by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself,"-contradicts
26
both constitutional tradition and common sense. 0
The Smith Court justified its conclusion by referring to the erratic
application of the compelling interest test in the free exercise context.
The Court reasoned that there was little, outside the employment context
as it applied to the free exercise of religion, that was not considered a
compelling state interest. 207 Thus, notwithstanding the complaints of
religious adherents to the contrary, the Court has found compelling gov198. Id. at 218. The parents had been subject to a fine for failure to comply. Id. at 207, 218.
199. Id. at 231-32. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (discussing the
rights of parents to provide religious education for children).
200. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
201. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
202. Id. at 874. The drug rehabilitation center where the claimants worked had a no-tolerance
rule for its employees. During the state court proceedings, one of their supervisors testified that
employees would similarly have been dismissed had they taken wine during Catholic Mass.
203. Id.
204. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986).
205. Id. at 879.
206. Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
207. Id. at 877-79. The Court did not explain why or whether this distinction mattered. Nor
did it explain, given that Smith was also an employment case, why the Court should not be bound
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ernment interests in maintaining the tax system, 2°8 preserving national
security, 20 9 ensuring public safety, 21 providing public education, 21 and
enforcing participation in the social security system.2 t2 Except in the
employment context, 213 the compelling interest test was always applied
in conjunction with some other constitutionally protected right, such as
freedom of speech or freedom of the press.2 14
Smith's critics rallied around its central defect: "[T]he Free Exercise Clause," Justice O'Connor recently explained, "is not simply an
antidiscrimination principle that protects only against those laws that
single out religious practice for unfavorable treatment. ' 21 5 Rather, the
Free Exercise Clause "is best understood as an affirmative guarantee of
the right to participate in religious practices and conduct without impermissible governmental interference, even when such conduct conflicts
with a neutral, generally applicable law. 2 t6 Professor McConnell has
similarly argued that free exercise exemptions are not a special preference for religious minorities. They simply reflect the requirement of
state neutrality toward all religions.21 7
The reach of the Free Exercise Clause is beyond the scope of this
article. Nevertheless, a few general observations are in order. First,
both Sherbert and Smith are problematic-Sherbert because it goes too
far, and Smith because it does not go far enough. The holding of Sherbert appears wholly inconsistent with the bulk of free exercise cases,
which have found matters no more compelling than employment benefits sufficiently important to defeat religious exemption claims. While
Sherbertcould have enunciated a perfectly appropriate test for free exercise claims, it nevertheless came to the wrong result. Sherbert imposed
by its precedent in that area. Presumably, the illegality of ingesting peyote justified the
distinction.
208. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699.
209. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971).
210. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944).
211. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
212. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982).
213. The Court found no compelling interest in three other unemployment-free exercise cases.
See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1987); Thomas v. Review Board of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981).
214. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. Professor McConnell has noted that this may have been a
rather disingenuous statement by the Court. On this logic, Wisconsin v. Yoder would have been
wrong, since the adherents in that case had no independent constitutional right to withhold their
children from school. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1120-21 (1990).
215. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2177 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing
Smith, 494 U.S. at 892-903 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
216. Id.
217. See McConnell, supra note 214, at 1130.
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contorted results onto a series of successor cases that found "compelling" state interests in order to prevent the free exercise trump.
Likewise, Smith appears to be an act of judicial exasperation that
reflects an accumulated frustration with the inconsistency of post-Sherbert free exercise jurisprudence. Yet Smith's critics are correct in that
the Free Exercise Clause is more than a prohibition on government discrimination against religion. The essential question is: How much
more? As discussed in Section III.A.2., infra, RFRA is Congress'
attempt to answer the question by reference to Sherbertand Yoder, but it
seems to beg the question posed by the shortcomings of those decisions.
What is clear is that when laws involving commerce conflict with religious concerns, the laws can, and should, trump.
c.

Religion and Commerce

Whatever else heightened scrutiny may mean in free exercise cases,
it has had little force in cases involving a clash of commercial and religious concerns. In such cases, the Court gives little weight to the religious concerns of the religious claimant, and instead takes a
transactional approach, emphasizing neither the beliefs nor the motivations of the parties, but rather the transaction that occurred. The Court
has generally held that the mere fact that religious exercise directly or
indirectly results in greater transaction costs to the adherent is not
grounds for a religious exemption from a neutral law of general application. This approach has been justified by concerns similar to the concerns expressed in Smith-that religious exemptions to commercial
obligations could lead to wholesale systemic disruption.
For example, in Braunfield v. Brown, the Court refused to void
Sunday closing laws as excessively burdensome to Jews, who were
forced to close for two days rather than one because they observe Sabbath on Saturday.2" 8 Although the law resulted in no excessive cost of
worship, it deprived Jews of an extra day of income. Similarly, in
United States v. Lee, the Court refused to exempt, on free exercise
grounds, an Amish farmer from paying his share of social security taxes,
even though the Amish oppose the national social security system.2 19
218. 366 U.S. 599, 601, 609 (1961).
219. 455 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1982).

Lee contains the Court's best articulation of this

transactional approach: "When followers of a particular sect enter into a commercial transaction
as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and
faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that

activity." Lee, 455 U.S. at 216. Some may argue that tithing, a form of religious giving, is not
voluntary but compulsory, and that this dictum should not apply to insolvent religious donors who

tithe. However, because it appears that religious donors who are compelled to tithe may
nevertheless choose the form of the tithe (cash, goods or services), this dictum should apply even
in the instance of tithing.
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Again, this exacted a non-worship-related cost for complying with religious dictates.
The Court even upholds added costs when they apply directly to
religious worship. Thus, in Hernandez v. Commissioner, the Court

rejected the Scientologists' free exercise claim that denial of an income
tax deduction for "auditing and training sessions (which are part of
Scientology's religious practice), placed a heavy burden on a central
practice of Scientology by deterring adherents from attending the pre-

scribed sessions."0 The Court, focusing on the transaction, reasoned
that the only burden section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code imposed
was economic, not religious, since "[a]ny burden ...derives solely from

the fact that, as a result of the deduction denial, adherents have less
money available to gain access to [auditing and training] sessions."22 '
Perhaps the rule to extract from these cases, as suggested by Professor McConnell and Judge Posner, is that laws that increased costs to

religious adherents are not constitutionally infirm if they also apply to
the non-religious. 2 2 Increased cost is incidental and, therefore, constitu223
tionally tolerable, if free exercise is not the sole reason for the CoSt.
In dicta, Sherbert comments that the denial of employment benefits
operates as a fine. This seems wrong. Anyone who refused to work on

Sunday, whether for religious or secular reasons, would lose their benefits under the law at issue in Sherbert.
The history behind the Free Exercise Clause supports this interpretation. Free exercise, as it was understood both before and shortly after

ratification of the Constitution, may well have tolerated a greater range
of religious exemption than envisioned in Smith, but religious rights
would never be permitted to trump private rights. Thus, the Charter of
Rhode Island of 1663, cited by Justice O'Connor in her Boerne dissent,
still limited freedom of worship to cases where adherents did not use
their religious liberty to "licentiousness and profaneness; nor to the civil
injury, or outward disturbance of others. 2 2 4 Even Professor McConnell
220. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 698 (quoting Petitioners' Brief). The Court was apparently also
persuaded by the fact that the petitioners' deductions required no IRS inquiry into valuation, since
the church set its own fees. Id. at 698 n.12.
221. Id. at 699. This approach was soon followed in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1990), where the Court determined that the levying
and collection of generally applicable sales and use taxes imposed no constitutionally significant
burden on appellants (evangelists).
222. Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 35 (1989) ("a regulation is not neutral in an economic
sense if, whatever its normal scope or its intentions, it arbitrarily imposes greater costs on
religious than on comparable nonreligious activities.").
223. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
224. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2179 (1997) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia
pointed out that, at the time the proviso in the Rhode Island charter was enacted, the licentiousness
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believes that the stopping point for religious exemptions should come
when free exercise claims interfere with private rights: "Free exercise
should be protected 'in every225case where it does not trespass on private
rights or the public peace.'
Every case in which a religious donation is challenged as a fraudulent conveyance involves a choice between the right of free exercise and
a trespass on private rights, because the purpose of avoiding a constructively fraudulent conveyance is the payment of creditors holding allowable claims against the debtor.226 In paying the church rather than
creditors, the debtor will have trespassed on the private rights of her
creditors to repayment. The obligation to pay valid claims is a central
part of the facially neutral commercial law. Because even the broadest
understanding of free exercise would not sanction a debtor's failure to
pay creditors, fraudulent conveyance laws should not ordinarily fail
through implementation of a free exercise exemption.
A free exercise challenge, however, is not inconceivable. One can
imagine circumstances where fraudulent conveyance laws may be
applied unconstitutionally, in a "widespread pattern" of discrimination.227 If, for example, Jewish debtors' purchases of High Holy Day
tickets are found to be supported by consideration but tithes are not,
there may be an impermissible application of fraudulent conveyance
laws.228 Where to draw the boundary properly is not always clear and
should be left to the court on a case-by-case basis. As a general matter,
it is difficult to conceive of a circumstance where an insolvent religious
donor would be permitted to assert free exercise grounds in order to
prevent avoidance of a religious donation.
Given these principles, it is difficult to see how a fraudulent conveyance claim should be foiled. Yet, that is exactly what happened in
Young, where the Eighth Circuit refused to permit a bankruptcy trustee
to avoid a religious donation as a constructive fraudulent conveyance
in question meant disobedience to general laws. Id. at 2173 (citing Queen v. Lane, 6 Mod. 128,
87 Eng. Rep. 884, 885 (Q.B. 1704)). Ironically, Professor McConnell's own scholarship indicates
that the earliest contests between the free exercise principle and laws of general application went
in favor of laws of general application, as in Stansbury v. Marks, where a Jew was fined for
refusing to testify on his Sabbath. McConnell, supra note 214, at 1133.
225. McConnell, supra note 214, at 1109, 1127 (quoting 1822 letter from James Madison to
Edward Livingston).
226. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 541 (1995).
227. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
228. Note, however, that such a result would not imply a different level of scrutiny, but simply,
as in the Lukumi case, a sense that the government violated its obligation to remain neutral across

religions. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534-35 (1993)
(holding a facially neutral city ordinance forbidding ritual slaughter impermissible targeted at
Santeria religion).
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under the Bankruptcy Code.2 2 9 Since it is unclear whether RFRA still
applies to federal law, and a number of states appear committed to passing their own versions, there are likely to be more, rather than fewer,
uses of a free exercise-type defense to a fraudulent conveyance action.
2.

RFRA

Troubled by Smith, Congress passed RFRA in an attempt to restore
the pre-Smith level of judicial scrutiny of free exercise-type claims. The
operative provisions of RFRA are expressed in section 3, which
provides:
(a) In General-Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Exception-Government may substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.2 30
RFRA's stated purposes are: "(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . ..and Wisconsin v. Yoder ...
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened"; and "(2) to provide a claim or defense to
persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government."231 Assuming religion has been identified,2 32 the key inquiries
under RFRA are (i) whether the governmental action in question substantially burdens a person's religious practice, and (ii) if so, whether the
statute's burdens further a compelling government interest in the least
restrictive manner possible.23 3 At least as applied to state law, the
Court, in Boerne v. City of Flores, held that RFRA was not good law.
In Boerne, the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio applied for a
building permit to enlarge a church in Boerne, Texas. When local zoning authorities denied the permit, relying on an ordinance governing his229. See In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1997).
231. Id. § 2000bb(b).
232. This article assumes that insolvent religious donors are actually adherents of a religion. It
is worth noting, however, that the Court's approach to defining religion has been subject to some
debate, which will certainly spill over to the debate on the legitimacy of statutes like RFRA, since
RFRA merely defers to First Amendment precedent on the exercise of religion. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-2(4) (defining exercise of religion to mean the exercise of religion under the First
Amendment). See TRIBE, supra note 179, § 14-6, at 1179 (discussing developing definition of
religion under the First Amendment).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).
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toric preservation in a district which, they argued, included the church,
the Archbishop brought suit challenging the permit denial under RFRA.
The district court concluded that, by enacting RFRA, Congress exceeded
the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional.234 The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that
RFRA exceeded Congress' remedial powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the guarantee that no state shall make or enforce
any law depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law," including, by incorporation, the free exercise rights of
the First Amendment. RFRA, however, was a substantive change to free
exercise jurisprudence that exceeded Congress' remedial powers. "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right
is. ' ' 2 35 Although acknowledging that "the line between measures that
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a
substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies," the Court
determined that RFRA crossed that line because the injury to be prevented or remedied lacked sufficient congruence and proportionality to
the means adopted.23 6

There are three important aspects to Boeme's holding. First, it
implicitly reaffirms Smith's limitation of the Free Exercise Clause to
cases where the state intentionally discriminates on the basis of religion,
either because a law was aimed at stifling a religious practice,2 37 or
because a widespread pattern of discrimination was shown.2 38 In other

words, the Court continues to believe that the Free Exercise Clause does
not "relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
' 23 9
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes). '
Second, the basis for this conclusion is founded in the systemic
234. Flores v. City of Boerne, Texas, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir. 1996).
235. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.

236. Id. ("RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It

appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections."). Id. at 2170.
237. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) ("[A]
law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible.").

238. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
239. Id. at 2172 (Scalia J., concurring) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 and Lee, 455 U.S. at

263 n.3).
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disruption concerns of Smith. 24° The sweeping coverage of RFRA
"ensure[d] its intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws
and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter," and exacting a significant litigation cost from the
states.241

Third, the opinion affirmed the Court's growing appreciation for
states' rights, noting that RFRA was a "considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens. 242 Indeed, it appears
that the holding of the case struck RFRA only as it applied to state laws,
since no federal law was in issue in Boerne.
Although Boerne will prevent the application of RFRA to state
fraudulent conveyance claims, there is no reason to believe that it may
not continue to apply to the fraudulent conveyance provision of the federal Bankruptcy Code. So far, it has been invoked in three separate
cases as a defense to a fraudulent conveyance attack under the Bankruptcy Code. Twice, it was held to be inadequate (Newman and Bloch),
and once it was held to be a viable defense (Young).
a. Newman

In Newman, the bankruptcy court for the district of Kansas held that
the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code violated
neither the Free Exercise Clause nor RFRA. The debtors, Paula and
Myrtle Newman donated approximately $2,400 to their church, Midway
Southern Baptist Church. This donation was made during the year prior
to their filing a bankruptcy petition and reflected their regular practice of
tithing.243 It was undisputed that the debtors were insolvent during that
year, that they had a sincere and firmly held belief in tithing, and that
they had no fraudulent intent in making their donations. 2 "
After determining that the debtors did not receive reasonably
equivalent value for their tithes and that section 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code was constitutional, the bankruptcy court considered whether Bankruptcy Code section 548 violated RFRA.245 The court applied the three240. See supra notes 201-16 and accompanying text.
241. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170.
242. Id. at 2171. This trend appears to have its roots in Lopez v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1624

(1995) (limiting the reach of the Commerce Clause).
243. In re Newman, 203 B.R. at 472. The amounts donated were in excess of ten percent of
the debtors' annual income. Id.
244. Id. The Newmans transferred $2,457.72 to their church during the year prior to their
bankruptcy, but the trustee sought to recover only $2,442.22. The debtors' transfers of $5.50 for

meals and $10.00 for hymnals were considered to have been made for reasonably equivalent
value, which the trustee appears not to have attempted to recover. Id. at 472.
245. In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 251.
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prong test developed in Werner v. McCotter,z46 which construed a substantial burden as being a law, rule, or regulation that (i) "significantly
inhibit[s] or constrain[s] conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a [person's] individual beliefs"; (ii) "meaningfully curtail[s]" the ability to express adherence to a person's faith; or (iii)
denie[s] a person "reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities
that are fundamental" to the person's religion. 47
Using the Werner three-prong test, the bankruptcy court concluded
that, although tithing was a central tenet of the Newmans' religious practice, there was no evidence that section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
prevented them from tithing because the Newmans had, in fact, paid the
tithe. 48 "The statute, by its own operation, does nothing to prevent the
debtors' fulfillment of their personally held religious obligation to tithe
and, therefore, does not place a 'substantial burden' on the debtors'
practice of their religion." 249 The bankruptcy court did not, however,

consider the second or third prongs, namely, whether section 548 meaningfully curtailed the Newmans' ability to express adherence to their
faith, or denied them a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities
fundamental to their faith. 5 o
The bankruptcy court also concluded that, even if section 548 did
substantially burden the Newmans' religious practice, it serves a compelling governmental interest because "recovery of fraudulent transfers
has been a basic tenet of bankruptcy law for 400 years. '251 Noting that
Congress could have exempted tithes from the fraudulent conveyance
statute, the Newman court concluded that section 548 was sufficiently
narrow to survive a challenge under RFRA since "[c]learly, the statute
was drawn in such a way as to balance the ability of the debtor[s] to
246. 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995).
247. In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 251 (citing Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir.

1995) (citations omitted)).
248. In re Newman, 203 B.R. at 476. Although affirming the bankruptcy court's holding, the
district court disagreed with this finding, noting that "tithing involves not only the act of

sacrificing a portion of one's income; it also encompasses giving the church the economic benefit
of the tithe in order to support the church's mission." Id.
249. In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 251.

250. Id. See also Werner, 49 F.3d at 1480. It appears that tithing would not have satisfied
either the second or third Werner prongs since avoidance of the tithes would not have
meaningfully curtailed the Newmans' ability to express adherence to their faith because it was
already expressed in the donations. Further, avoidance would not have denied them a reasonable
opportunity to engage in activities fundamental to their faith, since they were not denied the
opportunity, and there is no apparent reason to believe that tithing is fundamental to any faith or
must take the form of cash payments. Id.
251. In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 251-52. The Newman bankruptcy court cited the Young
district court, which was subsequently reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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dispose of property with the need to protect unsecured creditors.
b.

25 2

Bloch

In Bloch, the debtors made a contribution of $6,328 in 1992 to their
church. In 1993, the same year they filed for bankruptcy relief, they
contributed $5,205.253 Their bankruptcy trustee sued the church, the
Word of Life Christian Center, claiming these donations were constructive fraudulent conveyances under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
and under Colorado's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
There was no dispute that the debtors were sincere in their religious faith
or that they usually attended church between one and four times a
week.254
In addition to finding that these donations lacked consideration, the
District Court for the District of Colorado 255 also held that RFRA
offered no defense. Like Newman, the Bloch court applied the Werner
test to determine that fraudulent conveyance laws imposed no substantial burden because "[s]ection 548 interferes minimally with the debtors'
ability to tithe," and "did not constrain the [d]ebtors' conduct nor their
ability to express their adherence to their faith. '2 56 The Bloch court further echoed the Newman court, holding that if fraudulent conveyance
laws constituted a substantial burden on free exercise, then they were
supported by a compelling governmental interest.25 7
c.

Young

In Young, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals arrived at an essentially opposite conclusion from the Newman and Bloch courts, although
it did so with little discussion. RFRA was therefore found an effective
defense to transfers that were otherwise considered voidable fraudulent
conveyances.
In Young, the church argued in the district court, before RFRA was
enacted, that applying section 548(a) would violate the free exercise and
establishment clauses of the First Amendment. The district court first
applied Smith, and held that the church's free exercise claim failed on
the merits because the Bankruptcy Code was a neutral law of general
252. In re Newman, 183 B.R. at 252. Whether Congress could, or should, exempt religious
obligations or donations raises interesting issues, including entanglement problems.
253. In re Bloch, 207 B.R. at 946.

254. Id.
255. It is unclear why this adversary proceeding was heard by the district court. Ordinarily,
such matters are heard by the bankruptcy court and are subject to ordinary appellate review by the
district court for the district in which the bankruptcy court sits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
256. In re Bloch, 207 B.R. at 946 (citing Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir.
1995)).
257. Id. at 951 (citing In re Newman, 203 B.R. at 477).
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applicability which has only an incidental effect on religion. 251 In the
alternative, the district court held that, even if the pre-Smith free exercise
test applied, "[t]he government's policy of allowing debtors to get a
as fairly as possible
fresh start while at the same time treating creditors259
qualifies as a compelling [governmental] interest.
The district court further held that section 548(a) did not unfairly
discriminate against religious contributions, and that the debtors' hybrid
right to free speech and free exercise was not impaired, because limiting
the amount an individual may contribute to a cause or organization only
marginally restricts the contributor's ability to communicate that particular message . 26° The district court noted that section 548(a)(2)(A) was
narrowly drawn, content-neutral, protected an important governmental
interest in maximizing the debtors' estate, and did not violate the doctrine of separation of church and state.2 6 '

On November 13, 1993, after the district court rendered its decision
and while the appeal was pending in the Eighth Circuit, President Clinton signed RFRA into law.26 2 Concluding that it could apply RFRA
retroactively,263 the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, finding
that, because RFRA is more protective of the right of free exercise than
Smith, recovery of the Youngs' tithes substantially burdened their free
exercise of religion, was not in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and therefore violated RFRA.264
The Young court began its analysis by acknowledging that, in order
to be a substantial burden, "'the governmental action must burden a religious belief rather than a philosophy or a way of life. [T]he burdened
belief must be sincerely held by the [person].' "265 Although the Young
court recited the Werner three-part test used to determine a substantial
258. In re Young, 152 B.R. at 953-54 (citations omitted).

259. Id. at 954.
260. Id.
261. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1975)).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1997).
263. In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1416-17.
264. Id. at 1413, 1417. Whether RFRA is more protective of the free exercise right than Smith
is less interesting than whether, assuming RFRA is constitutional, it is more protective than
Sherbert and its progeny. Id. at 1418.
265. Id. (quoting Werner, 49 F.3d at 1480 n.1). This statement poses several problems. First,
it is unclear what distinction a court could draw between a religious belief and a philosophy or
way of life. It is difficult to understand how, as the Young court concluded, spending money
(tithing) is the former rather than the latter. Similarly, it is also difficult to understand how a court
using the Werner formulation could ever determine the sincerity of belief if, as the Hernandez
court noted: "It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or
practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds."

Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699. See also Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87 ("It is no more appropriate for
judges to determine the centrality of religious beliefs before applying a compelling interest test in
the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the importance of ideas before
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burden, it placed little significance on the test and "assume[d] that the
recovery of these contributions would substantially burden the debtors'
free exercise of religion."2'6 6 The Young court summarily concluded that

"[p]ermitting the government to recover these contributions would effectively prevent the debtors from tithing, at least for the year immediately
preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petitions."2'67
The court dismissed as irrelevant the trustee's arguments that the

Youngs could continue to tithe, that there were other ways in which the
Youngs could express their religious beliefs, or that the retroactive
nature of the fraudulent conveyance laws (only payments already made
can be avoided) meant that their right to tithe was not impaired. "It is
sufficient that the governmental action in question meaningfully curtails,

albeit retroactively, a religious practice of more than minimal significance in a way that is not merely incidental. 268
The court then considered whether the fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code were compelling governmental interests.
The Young court compared the reasoning of the Newman court2 6 9 with
the reasoning of In re Tessier, a case under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy

Code,2 70 where the trustee objected to the debtor's reorganization plan
which included a provision for the payment of $100 per month in tithes
to the debtor's church.2 7

Acknowledging that the Tessier court argua-

applying the compelling interest test in the free speech field.") (internal quotations omitted). The
Young court addressed none of these issues.
266. In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1418. Other tests could be used to determine whether a law
imposes a substantial burden. For example, the Ninth Circuit considers whether a religious
practice is mandated by the adherent's religion. See Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 348, 949 (9th Cir.
1995) (quoting Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987), affid sub nom,
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 689 (1989) ("The religious adherent . . . has the
obligation to prove that a governmental [action] burdens the adherent's practice of his or her
religion ... by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct ... which the faith mandates.
This interference must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an
interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine.")). Although tithing, or
other forms of religious spending, may be strongly encouraged, it is unclear whether they are
mandated. Even if tithing is mandated by certain faiths, it seems highly unlikely that any faith
would mandate the manner in which the tithe is to be made (cash, goods or services), a choice
which would have obvious implications for creditors of the insolvent religious donor.
Interestingly, the Gomez court cites Hernandez for this proposition, suggesting that the obligation
to spend money will not be considered a mandatory religious activity.
267. In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1418.
268. Id. at 1418-19 (citing In re Tessier, 190 B.R. at 403-04).
269. See discussion supra Section III.A.2.a.
270. 11 U.S.C. § 1330 (a), (b) (1994). Although chapter 13 reorganizations are available only
to individuals of somewhat limited means who have a regular income, it is similar to chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code in that its goal is reorganization rather than liquidation.
271. In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1420 (citing In re Tessier, 190 B.R. at 405). The Tessier court
also found RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the Bankruptcy Code. 190 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1995), aff'd, 1997 WL 650968 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 1997). The procedural context of Tessier
was quite different from Young or Newman, as it involved confirmation of a reorganization plan,
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bly used a narrower test than Newman by holding that compelling governmental interests are "only those interests pertaining to survival of the
republic or the physical safety of its citizens, 272 the Young court, nonetheless, considered Tessier "substantively similar" to the Youngs'
case.

27 3

Although Tessier acknowledged that "the government clearly has
interests in . . . providing the debtor with a fresh start, efficiently

administering bankruptcy cases, [and] protecting the interests of creditors," such interests fell "short of direct national security and public
safety concerns. '"274 The Tessier court concluded that these interests,
although "rational, and even important," were "not sufficiently grave to
deserve the 'compelling' label when balanced against a parishioner's
free exercise of religion. 2 75 Agreeing with Tessier, the Young court
concluded that "the interests advanced by the bankruptcy system are not
' 276
compelling under RFRA.
The reasoning of the court of appeals in Young is not persuasive for
three reasons. First, the court failed to carefully consider whether fraudulent conveyance laws substantially burden religious exercise, or even
whether tithing is a form of religious exercise. It is difficult to see how
spending money was, in that case, an exercise of religion that was substantially burdened by application of fraudulent conveyance laws. The
donors made the donations, even if they were later taken away from the
church.277

Moreover, although a discussion of the nature of tithing is beyond
the scope of this article, there is no apparent reason why the tithe in
Young had to be in the form of cash. If the Youngs had instead given
which required the debtor to pay all of its projected disposable income for three years to creditors.
Charitable contributions were found not to be "reasonable living expenses," or disposable income
for purposes of this calculation. Id. at 403.
272. In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1420 (citing In re Tessier, 190 B.R. at 405). It is unclear how the
Tessier court developed this test.
273. In opposition to the Young court, one may argue that Tessier was not substantively similar
to the Youngs' case. For example, the Tessier trustee's success would directly prevent a future
religious exercise, whereas the Young trustee sought to undo that which the Youngs' had already
accomplished.
274. In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1420 (quoting In re Tessier, 190 B.R. at 405).
275. Id. (citations omitted).

276. Id.
277. One may argue, similar to Young, that exercise does not simply require that the act be
permitted, but that the act not be later disturbed by law. This is an odd approach because it gives a
potentially enormous deference to religious exercise. Theoretically, under this atemporal
interpretation of exercise, religious adherents or institutions could claim, retroactively or
prospectively, that all types of actions are forms of exercise which preclude state interference.
While Smith may be a flawed opinion, it nonetheless properly recognizes that individual

conscience should not ordinarily permit one to become a law unto oneself in order to defeat
private rights. The exercise itself must be the stopping point.
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services or goods, the liquidity of their asset base would not have been
diminished and, for the reasons discussed in Section II.B.1, supra, there
would have been no constructive fraudulent conveyance to begin with.
Finally, the court used a home-made compelling interest test that
ignored free exercise precedent that finds a variety of state laws compelling when balanced against individual free exercise claims.278 As discussed above when free exercise claims compete with commercial laws
of general application, enhanced cost to an adherent or religious institution is not a constitutional basis to strike such laws.27 9

After the Boerne decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration. 8 ° In
Young, it is unclear how the Eighth Circuit will proceed in light of
Boerne. On the one hand, the Eighth Circuit may decide that Boerne
dealt only with state law, that RFRA continues to apply to federal law,
and that its substantial burden analysis survives. On the other hand, the
court may decide Boerne went beyond state law, based on concerns
expressed in Boerne about the sweeping coverage of RFRA.2 s1 If the
Eighth Circuit views this separation of powers-like concern as part of
the holding of Boerne, it may find that RFRA does not trump the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent conveyance provision.
As noted, I believe a fraudulent conveyance action ordinarily
imposes no substantial burden because constructive fraudulent conveyance laws are facially neutral, commercial laws of general application
that protect private rights. The laws burden only the recipients of economically unfair bargains from insolvent transferors, whether or not
religiously motivated or compelled. The First Amendment should not
alter this formulation. The next section examines why the same should
be true in cases involving political spending should reach the same
result.
B.

Political Speech, Political Spending

Like religious donations, contributions or expenditures on behalf of
political candidates or causes by an insolvent donor implicate the First
Amendment and fraudulent conveyance laws. As in religious donations,
the exercise of political rights in the form of spending could arguably
278. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
279. See discussion supra Section HI.A. 1.
280. In re Young, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997) (vacating judgment and remanding in light of
holding in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)).
281. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2170 (the breadth of RFRA "ensure[d] its intrusion at every level of
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and
regardless of subject matter.").
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enjoy the strictest level of judicial protection.2 82 Unlike First Amendment protections of religious practices, however, the Court remains
steadfast in applying the strictest scrutiny to the regulation of political
speech. Ever since Buckley v. Valeo, the Court has consistently held that
restrictions on campaign expenditures "necessarily reduce[ ] the quantity
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. 2 83 This section
of the article discusses whether fraudulent conveyance laws should be
considered such a restriction.
1.

BUCKLEY AND STRICT SCRUTINY

The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech
,,284 The Court has used three different tests for speech cases: (i) the
"...
incidental regulation test;285 (ii) the content-based regulation test;2 86 and
(iii) the time, place, and manner test in regulating the physical form of
protected speech.2 87 Scholars have distilled these three tests to two
tracks: a "higher" track, involving direct, content-regulating burdens,
and a "lower" track, involving incidental, content-neutral burdens.288
Prior to the Court's landmark First Amendment analysis in Buckley,
the Court's political speech jurisprudence was reflected in cases such as
United States v. O'Brien, which affirmed the conviction of a war protester under a statute that proscribed the burning of draft cards. 289 The
O'Brien Court recognized a dichotomy between regulation of pure
speech, upheld only upon a showing of dire necessity, and regulation of
non-speech harms arising from speech-related conduct, held to a considerably less exacting scrutiny. 290 Buckley stretched the O'Brien dichot282. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.
283. Id. at 19.
284. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The free speech guarantee applies to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
285. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172, 3177-78 (1986); United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-89 (1985); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). See
also David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MiAMi L. REV. 491 (1988).
286. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, ContentNeutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48 (1987).

287. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).
288. Day, supra note 285, at 493-96; see also Dorf, supra note 150, at 1177.
179, § 12-2, at 789-94 (2d ed. 1988).

TRIBE,

supra note

289. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court expressly
rejected the contention that draft card burning was tantamount to pure speech, since the statute
banning draft card burning was directed at a harm unrelated to the message that a card-burner
might seek to convey. Its incidental effect upon speech was justified as the least restrictive way to

secure the governmental interest in avoiding the harm caused by draft card burning.
290. O'Brien established the following four-part test to determine whether a content-neutral

regulation violates free speech: (i) the regulation must be "within the constitutional power of the
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omy to the breaking point, and held that spending money was more like
pure speech than speech-related conduct, and was, therefore, subject to
the strictest scrutiny.2 9 1

In Buckley, the Court considered constitutional challenges to key
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA"),
which (i) limited individual political contributions to $1,000 to any single candidate per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000
by any contributor; and (ii) limited independent expenditures by individuals and groups "relative to a clearly identified candidate" to $1,000 per
year.

29 2

After certain fact-finding procedures conducted in the District
Court for the District of Columbia, the Federal Circuit Court, on plenary
review, rejected most of the plaintiffs' challenges to the statute. The
court, instead, found a clear and compelling interest in preserving the
integrity of the electoral process.29 3 On that basis, the court upheld the

substantive provisions of FECA with respect to campaign contributions
and expenditures. Arguing before the Supreme Court, the appellants
alleged that the appellate court had failed to give FECA the critical scrutiny required under accepted First Amendment principles. They claimed
that limiting the use of money for political purposes constituted a
"restriction on communication" that violated the First Amendment, since
"virtually all meaningful political communications in the modem setting
'
involve the expenditure of money. "294
The Court agreed.

government"; (ii) it must further "an important or substantial governmental interest"; (iii) that
interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression"; and (iv) the incidental
restriction must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 377. Given the inability of this test to reach true free expression harms, but to create
litigation, it has been characterized as the "worst of all possible worlds." Dorf, supra note 150, at
1204.
291. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6 (citing Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as
amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263).
292. Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 19. The Court noted that:
By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation
upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or
political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability
to engage in free communication. A contribution serves as a general expression of
support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying
basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not
increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests
solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the
contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support
for the candidate.
Id. at 20-21. Whether the distinction between expenditures and contributions makes constitutional
sense is debatable. The distinction should also have little bearing on a fraudulent conveyance
challenge to a political donation, since the focus of such a litigation is on the value, if any,
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Recognizing a constitutional distinction between campaign contributions and campaign expenditures, the Court held that expenditure limitations "represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on
the quantity and diversity of speech. 295 Such limitations "operate in an
area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities." In this context, the First Amendment "affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order 'to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' ,,296 "This no more than reflects our 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.' "297
Two important elements were articulated in Buckley's holding.
First, the Court observed that the presence of a non-speech element, the
expenditure of money, did not strip political speech of its First Amendment protection.
Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and
spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court
has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the
expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First
Amendment.298
Second, the Court noted that in O'Brien, and in other time, place,
and manner restriction cases,2 99 the government had not sought to justify

its statute in terms of any interests predicated on suppressing communication. FECA, by contrast, was designed, among other things, to restrict
both the political voice of the affluent and excessive campaign speech
by limiting campaign spending.
The critical difference between this case and those time, place, and
received by the donor for the donation, regardless of the characterization of the donor's donation.
This distinction continues in the Court's political spending jurisprudence. "[T]he Court's cases

have found a 'fundamental constitutional difference between money spent to advertise one's views
independently of the candidate's campaign and money contributed to the candidate to be spent on

his campaign."'

Colorado Republican Fed. Election Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election

Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2315 (1996) (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)).
295. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
296. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).

297. Id. at 16 (citations omitted). While that may be true, the statement is a double negative
that merely avoids the main question. Was spending money, as regulated by FECA, speech? The
Court's answer did not garner absolute support. As Judge Wright emphatically explained,
"[m]oney... may be related to speech, but money itself is not speech." J. Skelly Wright, Politics
and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1019 (1985) (emphasis in original).
298. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17-18 (citing Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v.

Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)).
299. Id. at 18-19.
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manner cases is that [FECA]'s contribution and expenditure limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication
and association by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties
in addition to any reasonable time, place, and manner regulations
otherwise imposed .... A restriction on the amount of money a
person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the
number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the
size of the audience reached. 3°
The Court rejected the legitimacy of FECA's goal of "equalizing
the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of
elections. '' 30 1 The Court explained that "the concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment, which was designed 'to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,"' and "'to
about of politassure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the 3bringing
02
ical and social changes desired by the people."'
In so stating, the Court established two key principles for purposes
of considering the legitimacy of a fraudulent conveyance attack on a
campaign expenditure. First, any reduction in the quantity of spending
on political campaigns impermissibly reduces the quantity of speech and
the size of the audience reached. Second, equalizing the quantity of
speech by regulation is simply not a sufficiently compelling state interest
to defeat the unfettered right to spend money on political candidates.
Since Buckley, the Court has consistently affirmed, or at least has
declined to modify, the holding of that case-that limitations on political expenditures violate the First Amendment. Most recently, the Court
in Colorado Republican Federal Election Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission,303 held that the phrase "expenditure[s] in
connection with,''3°4 as used in FECA, must be interpreted broadly.
"[R]estrictions on independent expenditures significantly impair the
ability of individuals and groups to engage in direct political advocacy,"
300. Id. at 48.
301. Id. at 49 (internal quotations omitted). The Court also rejected the contention that FECA

prevented corruption or its appearance since, "[i]t would naively underestimate the ingenuity and
resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have

much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election
or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign." Id. at 45. It is unclear why
attempts to stem the obvious abuses that result from unregulated campaign spending are
impermissible, even if "naive."
302.
303.
304.
U.S. 1,

116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) (1994).
Colorado Republican Fed. Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2315 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
19 (1976)).
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the Court explained, and "'represent substantial . . . restraints on the

quantity and diversity of political speech."' 30
Moreover, the Court has extended its Buckley reasoning to the corporate-donor context, albeit with certain limitations. For example, in
FirstNationalBank of Boston v. Belotti,3 ° 6 the Court held that a Massachusetts statute that prohibited certain business corporations from making contributions or expenditures in order to influence the outcome of
any ballot referendum "other than one materially affecting any of the
property, business or assets of the corporation" was unconstitutional.3"7
The Court rejected the argument that "speech that otherwise would be
within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation,"30 8 and instead found that "the
speech proposed by the [bank was] at the heart of the First Amendment's protection."30 9
In light of the principles established by Buckley and its progeny,
one should question the summary manner in which the District Court for
the District of Columbia in Carolina'sPride31° dismissed the defendant's asserted First Amendment defense. In Carolina'sPride, the insolvent donor's judgment creditors attacked as a fraudulent transfer
campaign contributions he had made to the 1992 Republican SenateHouse Dinner Committee. The 1992 Committee defended its position
by arguing that, because its fundraising activities were designed to support political candidates, "[t]he First Amendment has its 'fullest and
most urgent application"' 3 1'
While the court recognized that fundraising is needed for the
"effective dissemination of a political message," the court, nonetheless,
reasoned that fraudulent conveyance statutes "do not significantly
impinge on the right to free speech. 312 It concluded that "no heightened showing" was required under the First Amendment. Although the
Committee raised an interesting issue, its claims under the First Amendment were "completely irrelevant" 313 to application of the fraudulent
305. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
306. Id. at 768.
307. Id. at 784.

308. Id. at 776. The power of Buckley to defeat a fraudulent conveyance challenge to a
political expenditure is even more troubling in the corporate context than in the individual context,
since corporations generally incur greater indebtedness than individuals (thus they have a greater
body of creditors who would be harmed by a political donation), yet also undoubtedly feel greater
business pressure to make political donations than do individuals.
309. 858 F. Supp. 243 (D.D.C. 1994).
310. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
311. Id. at 246-47.
312. Id. at 247.
313. Id. (quoting Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. California Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378
(1990)) (noting that sales and use taxes on religious articles, in common with other merchandise,
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conveyance statutes. According to the Carolina'sPride court, the government may impose content neutral limitations on the right to free
expression. 3 4 Because the fraudulent conveyance statutes "apply to all
entities, charitable, political, or private," they are content neutral, and
"any effect these regulations might have on expressive activity is
incidental. 315
If, as Buckley held, "a restriction on the amount of money a person
or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached, ' 316 how can fraudulent conveyance laws pass constitutional muster? It is difficult to imagine that the Court would consider
repayment of creditors a more compelling government interest than the
prevention of campaign corruption or equalization of access to political
debate.
Yet this is exactly what a court would have to hold in order to
prevent the First Amendment from defeating a fraudulent conveyance
challenge to a campaign expenditure. This, however, would seem to
distort the relative importance of these two different policy goals. The
public purpose of preserving the integrity of the electoral system has to
be more important than application of the fraudulent conveyance laws.
This distortion is made even more apparent by considering the private nature of the rights at issue in a fraudulent conveyance action which
should be even less compelling than the public right to regulate campaign spending. In turn, this raises the specter of Lochner v. New
York,317 which gave great privilege to private rights over and above leg-

islative attempts to exercise police and regulatory powers for the public
welfare.
2.

BUCKLEY:

THE LOCHNERIAN

PARADOX

According to Professor Sunstein, Lochner v. New York has not been

entirely overruled.3"8 It lives on, Professor Sunstein argues, in cases
do not offend the First Amendment). See also Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp. 672, 681
(D.D.C. 1982)).
314. Carolina's Pride, 858 F. Supp. at 247 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)). To hold otherwise would improperly provide political organizations with
fundraising avenues otherwise proscribed. See There to Care, Inc. v. Commission of Ind. Dep't of
Revenue, 19 F.3d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994). Ironically, the Carolina's Pride court cited the
Young district court as support.
315. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17.
316. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
317. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
318. Id. at 884.
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such as Buckley, which he terms "a direct heir to Lochner."3'19 According to Professor Sunstein, Lochner was not wrong simply because it
reflected judicial activism. More importantly, Lochner was wrong
because it rested on an erroneous assumption about the relationship of
the state and the common law, and incorrectly held that the Constitution
requires legislative passivity in the face of conflicting common law.
As is familiar, in Lochner, the Court struck New York's maximum
hour law, reasoning that the right to enter into contracts was a "liberty"
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, with which the state
could not interfere.32 ° The majority reasoned that "the limit of the
police power has been reached and passed in this case ' 32 because the
law was not supported by a sufficiently compelling state interest: The
health of bakers was not sufficiently (important and/or) threatened by
unregulated hours as to require state interference with the employeremployee contract.
Lochner, therefore, viewed the status quo-the private right to
enter into contracts-as a "neutral" condition with which the state could
not interfere absent a compelling reason. Although Lochner has been
subject to much criticism, and is generally considered to have been de
facto overruled, Professor Sunstein has argued persuasively that contemporary decisions, such as Buckley, that rest heavily on concepts of "neutrality," hearken back to Lochner. "For the Lochner Court, neutrality,
322
understood in a particular way, was a constitutional requirement.
Chief among the requirements of neutrality was legislative deference to the common law, the "natural" source of legal and economic
order. Under the Lochnerian view reflected in Buckley, "the existing
distribution of wealth is seen as natural, and [legislative] failure to act is
seen as no decision at all ....

Buckley, like Lochner, grew out of an

understanding that for constitutional purposes, the existing distribution
of wealth must be taken as simply 'there,' and that efforts to change that
distribution are impermissible. 323
319. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57-58.

320. Id. at 58.
321. See Sunstein, supra note 317, at 874.
322. Id. This seems overstated. FECA would not have changed the distribution of wealth,
since no amount of money could have purchased an exemption. It imposed no higher costs on the
wealthy, or whomever sought to make impermissible expenditures, but properly attempted to
equalize access to certain rights, such as the right to purchase finite advertising time or space.
This may indirectly have had a redistributive affect, but it was not redistributive per se. It is also
worth noting that there is nothing inherently neutral about the marketplace. It simply reflects the
common law's preferences for the existing distribution of wealth and rights. In our system, this
particular distribution can perpetuate itself thanks largely to Buckley and its Lochnerian

underpinnings.
323. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (upholding Cable Television
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If Buckley creates a First Amendment defense to a fraudulent conveyance action, it also creates a Lochnerianparadox. The common law
rights sanctified by Lochner would have included fraudulent conveyance
actions, which have been a fixture of the common law since well before
1789. Although fraudulent conveyance actions may redistribute wealth
and unsettle expectations arising from contract and property rights (a
result forbidden by Lochner and Buckley), the power to do so has long
been in the hands of creditors and court-appointed fiduciaries. Paradoxically, the common law that Lochner exalted would create the very redistributive right that Buckley prohibits.
The only way out of this paradox is to recognize that constructive
fraudulent conveyance laws, even as applied to political spending, are
nothing more than content-neutral economic legislation subject to less
than heightened scrutiny.
3.

LESS-THAN-HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY-CONTENT-NEUTRAL

ECONOMIC

LEGISLATION

Courts should view fraudulent conveyance laws as content-neutral

economic legislation subject to less-than-heightened scrutiny, rather than
as an intrusion on First Amendment rights subject to heightened scrutiny. In order to do so, the Court has to limit Buckley's reach. One
approach would be to focus on the purpose of the fraudulent conveyance
statutes, rather than on the purpose of the spending. For example, by
analogy to its recent decision in Turner v. FCC,324 the Court could conclude that the purpose of fraudulent conveyance laws is merely to regulate the distribution of scarce economic resources, not to constrain
speech. Consequently, the Court may be able to limit Buckley's force
and review fraudulent conveyance laws under a more relaxed standard
of scrutiny as a "lower-track" law.
In Turner, certain cable programmers and operators challenged the
"must carry" requirements of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
Act of 1992 (the "Cable Act"), which requires that cable operators carry
the signals of a specified number of local broadcast television stations.
The Court began its analysis by noting that "not every interference with
speech triggers the same degree of scrutiny under the First Amendment. 3 25 In the context of broadcast regulation, the Court has historiConsumer Protection Act of 1992 under intermediate scrutiny as content-neutral economic
legislation).
324. Id. at 637.

325. Id. Speech-regulating rules have been tolerated where the speech-conveying medium was
physically limited in the following cases: See Riley v. National Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487
U.S. 781 (1988) (personal solicitation); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364,
377 (1984); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (print); Red Lion Broad.
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cally tolerated greater governmental limitations on speech than in other
'
media due to the "physical limitations of the broadcast medium."326
In
Turner, the basic question was whether this more relaxed level of scrutiny involving broadcast regulation would apply to the regulation of
cable television transmissions. The Court held that it did not, because
there was no "practical limitation on the number of cable speakers who
may use the cable TV medium. '"327
In order to determine which level of scrutiny to apply, the Court
considered the extent to which the Cable Act was content-based regula-

tion of speech. 328 Citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, a lower-track
time, place, and manner case, the Court noted that the "'principal

inquiry in determining content-neutrality.., is whether the government
has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagree329 A law that "confer[s] benefits or
ment with the message it conveys.' ,,
impose[s] burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views
expressed" would most likely be found content neutral.33 °

Concluding that the Cable Act was content-neutral, the Turner

Court noted that the burdens imposed and the privileges conferred by the
legislation were unrelated to the content of the plaintiffs' cable programCo. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969) (television); National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (radio).
326. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642. Whether a law is content-neutral or content-based is
difficult to discern. In Buckley, FECA was arguably content neutral, since it limited only the
quantity of money spent and did not differentiate based on the views of the spender. Yet it is
fairly clear that the Buckley Court viewed FECA as the equivalent of a content-based law, in that
the Court concluded that restrictions on the quantity of speech somehow affected the quality of
speech.
327. Id. at 639. The Court has subsequently distinguished Turner, and used heightened
scrutiny to strike, among others, the "segregate and block" provisions of the Cable Act in Denver
Area Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2391-2392 (1996) and

certain provisions of the Communications Decency Act. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,
117 S. Ct. 2392, 2343 (1997) (noting that strict scrutiny should apply to content-based regulation
of a communicative medium which, like the Internet and unlike broadcast airwaves, is effectively
unlimited). These distinctions do not dilute the general proposition for which Turner stands in
this context-content-neutral regulation of a scarce, speech-conveying medium should be
reviewed under less-than-heightened scrutiny.
328. Id. at 642 (emphasis added) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)).
329. Id. at 643 (citing City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984) (holding that an ordinance that prohibits the posting of signs on public property "is
neutral-indeed it is silent-concerning any speaker's point of view") and (citing Heffron v.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981) (State Fair
regulation requiring that sales and solicitations take place at designated locations "applies
evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds.")).
330. Id. at 640. It is not entirely clear that the Cable Act was content-neutral, as Congress
expressed a preference for local interests in enacting the legislation. Because local content is
going to be different from regional, national, or international content, it is difficult to see how the
law was content-neutral.
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ming, because they applied equally to all operators with 300 or more
subscribers.3 3 ' Nor was the Cable Act's manifest purpose to regulate
speech based on the message conveyed.3 32 Rather, "Congress' overriding objective in enacting [the] must-carry [provision of the Cable Act]
was not to favor programming of a particular subject matter, viewpoint,
or format, but rather to preserve access to free television programming. ' " 3 This purpose was "unrelated to the content of expression dis334
seminated by cable and broadcast speakers.
For purposes of assessing statutory goals, Turner provides analogies that would be useful to permit the application of the fraudulent conveyance statutes to avoid political expenditures by insolvent donors
notwithstanding Buckley's construction of the First Amendment. First,
Turner affirms the propriety of "lower-track" scrutiny for laws regulating the distribution of scarce communicative resources, such as broadcast frequencies or a debtor's limited asset base. Second, Turner affirms
the distinction between laws directed at speech from laws that have only
an incidental effect on speech. Like many commercial laws, there can
be no serious argument that fraudulent conveyance laws-which have
existed for more than 400 years-were not passed "because of agreement or disagreement with" a message conveyed by money spent by an
insolvent donor.
In short, if the Court focuses on fraudulent conveyance laws for
their purpose, which is to preserve an insolvent debtor's asset base for
the benefit of her creditors, it could limit Buckley's sweeping restrictions
on the regulation of campaign spending.
IV.

CHOICES

Regardless of how courts view the normative aspects of religious or
political giving, they will likely have to make certain choices about the
relationship that commercial rules, such as fraudulent conveyance laws,
have with constitutional rules. In jurisprudential terms, the choices will
be about choosing the level of scrutiny to apply and what kinds of consideration to deem adequate. In more fundamental terms, the choices
will undoubtedly reflect normative views about the implications the sub331. Id. at 645 (quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (internal

quotations omitted) ("Although the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit content-based
limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government's

asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression.")). See also Ward, 491 U.S. at
791-92.
332. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 646.
333. Id.
334. See, e.g., Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 382 (1893) (holding that
assets of insolvent debtor are held in trust for creditors).
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ject laws hold for the ongoing debate about the proper boundary
between that which is public and that which is private. Similarly, the
choices will include subsidiary debates about the state's role in restricting or promoting religious or political freedoms.
In the religious context, these choices will be about the extent to
which a court is willing to recognize the economic component of consideration received by an insolvent donor as well as the extent to which
spending money-making religious donations-should be considered
the "free exercise of religion." As argued in Section II.B.3.a., supra,
sometimes a religilous donor will have received "consideration" in connection with her religious donation that may have meaningful economic
value to the donor, and thus to her creditors. Courts should not ignore
such value merely because the transaction is denominated a religious
gift.
Nevertheless, where an insolvent religious donor receives no consideration (or receives consideration having no economic value), the gift
should not ordinarily be protected on First Amendment or RFRA
grounds. To extend strict scrutiny to facially neutral commercial statutes of general application would threaten the systemic disruption the
Smith Court properly feared, and would contradict established precedent
regarding the relationship between the Free Exercise Clause and neutral
commercial laws of general application.
In the political context, courts will have to choose the extent to
which they are willing to recognize economic value in the "opportunity"
purchased by an insolvent political donor as well as the extent to which
spending money on political candidates is a form of protected political
"speech." Although the opportunity purchased by a political donor may
have to be downplayed for federal election law purposes (bribes are forbidden, after all), it need not be disregarded in the fraudulent conveyance context. To do so would ignore the economic and business realities
of political spending.
Nevertheless, where a court concludes that an insolvent political
donor received inadequate economic consideration, it will then have to
choose whether to focus on the medium (spending money) or the
message (political support for a candidate). In the fraudulent conveyance context, courts should focus on the medium, and recognize that
spending money while insolvent (i.e., to the detriment of creditors)
should not be considered a form of political speech entitled to strict scrutiny. To hold otherwise would threaten the same sort of systemic disruption the Court has frowned upon in the religious context and would
contravene the Court's precedent on content-neutral regulation of scarce,
speech-conveying mediums.
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In addition, recognizing a First Amendment defense to a fraudulent
conveyance action in any context creates a collateral problem for creditors. Essentially, the insolvent debtor is not spending her own money,
but her creditors' money.33 5 If that is so-and spending money is protected by the First Amendment-why should the free exercise or political speech rights of the debtor's creditors also not matter? Should they
be forced to finance religious or political causes they find repugnant? It
is difficult to answer this question in an affirmative, yet principled,
manner.
Moreover, by subordinating the fraudulent conveyance laws to the
First Amendment or RFRA, courts will take another step toward using
what is supposed to be the public purpose of the First Amendmentgovernment neutrality toward religion and tolerance of diverse political
views-for private ends. Although this would probably make little economic difference to debtors and their religious or political donees, it will
be another step in the Lochnerization, or privatization, of that which is
supposed to be public, the First Amendment. It would, in other words,
be another small step toward private control of public rights-even
when the private actors exercising such rights would be trampling the
private repayment rights of creditors in doing so.
V.

CONCLUSION

Fraudulent conveyance laws are commercial laws, neutrally
enacted, generally applicable, and only minimally burdensome on religious exercise or political expenditures. As shown, the First Amendment rights embodied in the right to worship and the right to express
support for a political candidate may, under certain circumstances,
include the right to spend money on behalf of those causes, but not over
the complaints of creditors. Although courts should carefully assess
whether a religious or political donor actually receives economic consideraton for a donation, and ratify transactions where appropriate, even if
termed a gift, courts should not ordinarily view the First Amendment or
RFRA as trumping the orderly, equal payment of creditors with valid
claims against the donor. In sum, fraudulent conveyance laws should
not fall victim to the First Amendment. To hold otherwise would treat
spending money as protected worship or political speech, a fairly severe
distortion of both the First Amendment and the fraudulent conveyance
laws.
335. John Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, in JOHN DEWEY, 11
quoted in Sunstein, supra note 10, at 256.
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